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NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS

Disparate Impact, Uniﬁed Law
abstract. The last decade has seen the largest wave of franchise restrictions since the dark

days of Jim Crow. In response to this array of limits, lower courts have recently converged on a
two-part test under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This test asks if an electoral practice (1)
causes a disparate racial impact (2) through its interaction with social and historical discrimination. Unfortunately, the apparent judicial consensus is only skin-deep. Courts bitterly disagree
over basic questions like whether the test applies to speciﬁc policies or systems of election administration; whether it is violated by all, or only substantial, disparities; and whether disparities refer
to citizens’ compliance with a requirement or to their turnout at the polls. The test also sits on thin
constitutional ice. It comes close to ﬁnding fault whenever a measure produces a disparate impact
and so coexists uneasily with Fourteenth Amendment norms about colorblindness and Congress’s
remedial authority.
The section 2 status quo, then, is untenable. To ﬁx it, this Article proposes to look beyond
election law to the statutes that govern disparate impact liability in employment law, housing law,
and other areas. Under these statutes, breaches are not determined using the two-part section 2
test. Instead, courts employ a burden-shifting framework that ﬁrst requires the plaintiff to prove
that a particular practice causes a signiﬁcant racial disparity and then gives the defendant the opportunity to show that the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial interest. This framework,
the Article argues, would answer the questions that have vexed courts in section 2 cases. The framework would also bolster section 2’s constitutionality by allowing jurisdictions to justify their challenged policies. Accordingly, the solution to section 2’s woes would not require any leaps of doctrinal innovation. It would only take the uniﬁcation of disparate impact law.
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introduction
Say a state passes a law that makes it harder to vote, like a requirement to
show photo ID or a cutback to early voting. (This is not a far-fetched scenario;
more voting restrictions have been enacted over the last decade than at any point
since the end of Jim Crow.1) Suppose also that the state’s new law has a disparate
racial impact: that it affects a higher proportion of minority than nonminority
citizens. (This too is a plausible assumption; minority citizens are less affluent,
on average, and so more disadvantaged by measures that increase the resources
required for voting.2)
Courts and commentators agree that, standing alone, this racial disparity
does not breach section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the key statutory provision banning racial discrimination in voting.3 In the oft-repeated words of one
district court, “a plaintiff must demonstrate something more than disproportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.”4 Or as a prominent VRA litigator has put it, “Section 2 plaintiffs [must] establish . . . that the disparate impact of a challenged vote denial practice is not merely a statistical accident.”5
Now imagine that a litigant does come up with “something more” than a naked racial disparity—speciﬁcally, evidence that the disparity is caused by the
law’s interaction with historical and ongoing patterns of racial discrimination.
In a photo ID case, this evidence might show that minority citizens are poorer
than nonminority citizens; that their relative poverty is the product of discrimination; that because they are poorer, they are less likely to own cars; and that
because they drive less, they are also less likely to have driver’s licenses. In an
early-voting case, the causal chain might run from discrimination to worse job
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

See, e.g., New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 10, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america [https://perma.cc/8QE6-8F8N]
[hereinafter New Voting Restrictions] (counting twenty-four states that have adopted new voting restrictions since the 2010 election).
See, e.g., Daniel J. Hopkins et al., Voting but for the Law: Evidence from Virginia on Photo Identiﬁcation Requirements, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 83 (2017) (surveying eleven studies of
photo ID possession, almost all of which found substantial racial disparities).
Section 2 is codiﬁed at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). It is even more important now that the VRA’s
other pillar, section 5, has been neutered. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
(striking down the coverage formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject
to section 5’s preclearance requirement).
Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012). I am one of those who have
repeated this language. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013
SUP. CT. REV. 55, 108.
Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2
Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675, 680 (2014).
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qualiﬁcations to less ﬂexible work conditions to greater difficulty voting on Election Day to heavier reliance on early voting.
Given this kind of record, the emerging judicial consensus is that section 2 is
violated. In the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits—though not
necessarily in the Supreme Court, which has yet to decide a vote denial case under the VRA—liability ensues if an electoral policy (1) has a disparate racial impact that (2) is attributable to the policy’s interaction with discriminatory conditions.6 And properly so, according to many scholars. To cite a high-proﬁle pair,
Sam Issacharoff lauds the courts’ two-part test as a “breakthrough,”7 while Pam
Karlan extols its capacity “to disrupt politics as usual in the service of full civic
inclusion for long-excluded minority citizens.”8
But there is a problem with construing section 2 in this fashion. Section 2 is
a disparate impact provision—a law that imposes liability on the basis of discriminatory effect, not invidious intent. Section 2, however, is not the only such
provision. Rather, disparate impact theories are also recognized by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, by the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and by several more statutes.9 In these other areas, a violation is not established simply because a policy
interacts with discriminatory conditions to produce a disparate impact. Instead,
courts follow a well-developed framework under which (1) the plaintiff must
prove that a particular practice causes a signiﬁcant discriminatory effect; (2) the
defendant next has the opportunity to show that the practice is necessary to
achieve a substantial interest; and (3) the plaintiff may then demonstrate that
this interest could be attained in a different, less discriminatory way. The emerging consensus in the vote denial context thus threatens to drive a wedge between
section 2 and every other disparate impact provision. It risks turning section 2
into a lonely island in the disparate impact sea.
My aim in this Article, then, is to resist this consensus—to urge consistency
rather than variety in disparate impact law and to bring vote denial cases into the
familiar disparate impact fold. To state my thesis another way: to date, courts
have focused on the explanations for racial disparities in voting, especially the extent to which they are intertwined with past and present discrimination. In my
view, though, courts should scrutinize the interests that allegedly justify these
6.
7.
8.
9.

See Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial Litigation Since
Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J.F. 799, 802-09 (2018) (surveying the recent case law).
Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 92 IND.
L.J. 299, 317 (2016).
Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 789 (2016).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018) (codifying the disparate impact cause of action under
Title VII); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015) (recognizing a disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act).
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electoral disparities: how compelling they are, the degree to which they are advanced by challenged practices, and whether they could be furthered through
other means. That is what courts do in every other disparate impact domain, and
I see no good reason for vote denial cases to break the mold.
Beyond simplicity, what is the case for unifying disparate impact law? One
set of answers stresses the similarities between voting and employment, housing, and the other ﬁelds where disparate impact claims may be raised. As a historical matter, the VRA, Title VII, and the FHA are kindred spirits: crown jewels
of the civil rights era, enacted in a single burst of legislative activity, and sharing
the mission of ending racial discrimination. It would be entirely consistent with
these statutes’ common legacy for disparate impact law to implement them in
the same way.
Theoretically, too, the standard accounts of disparate impact law apply as
squarely to voting as to employment or housing. One model treats an unjustiﬁed
discriminatory effect as a proxy for the true concept of interest: a racially discriminatory purpose. Another approach deems a needless disparate impact an
evil in and of itself: an unwarranted racial stratiﬁcation in a society aspiring for
racial equality. Both perspectives extend naturally to vote denial. When an electoral policy differentially affects minority and nonminority citizens, and for no
good reason, the injury can be understood as an illicit motive that is suspected
but not proven. The harm can also be seen as the unnecessary disparate impact,
which prevents minority citizens from participating equally in the political process.
Substantively as well, voting resembles employment and housing in that it
is a valued good to which access is determined by criteria that not everyone can
satisfy. When these criteria disproportionally exclude minority members, they
produce racial disparities whether they pertain to the franchise, the workplace,
or the roof over one’s head. It is true that voting (unlike employment and housing) is exclusively regulated by the state. But this only means that it is public
rather than private interests that are the potential justiﬁcations for disparate impacts. It is also true that voting (again unlike employment and housing) is a
nonmarket, nonrivalrous good: one with no price and no limit to who may enjoy
it. This too, though, simply takes off the table one common rationale for racial
discrepancies: private actors’ pursuit of proﬁt.
The next reason to unify disparate impact law is more doctrinal. Not only
does the framework used by Title VII and the FHA apply fully to vote denial
cases; it also resolves many of the most contentious issues that have arisen in
these disputes. To name a few: Must section 2 litigants establish a large disparate
impact, or will any discriminatory effect do? The former, if Title VII is any guide.
Courts enforcing that provision have insisted on a racial disparity that is both
statistically signiﬁcant and substantively meaningful before ﬁnding an employer
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liable.10 What kind of disparate impact must be shown in section 2 litigation—a
difference between minority and nonminority citizens’ abilities to comply with
an electoral policy or an eventual gap in voter turnout? Again the former, according to Title VII. In a well-known case, the Supreme Court rejected the “suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at the bottom line.”11
Must the racial disparity caused by a voting rule also be linked to social and
historical discrimination? No, held the Court in another famous Title VII case
(thus undermining one of the pillars of the emerging section 2 consensus).12 It
is enough if the rule causes the disparity; there is no need for discrimination to
be part of the causal story too. And what is the right relief once an electoral policy
has been deemed unlawful—facial invalidation or judicial revision to lessen the
disparate impact? Courts have usually tossed out practices in their entirety in
Title VII and FHA proceedings. Less often, they have ordered race-conscious
remedies in order to undo the damage of the illegal activity.13 These more aggressive steps may also warrant consideration under section 2.
It is no surprise, of course, that employment and housing doctrine is so helpful here. It has been shaped over several decades by hundreds of appellate decisions, including many by the Supreme Court. In contrast, most courts of appeals
have yet to adopt a standard for section 2 vote denial claims, and, as noted earlier,
the Supreme Court has never grappled with such a challenge. But that is precisely
my point. It makes little sense for section 2 to evolve independently from the rest
of disparate impact law. It should join the main line of precedent and take advantage of its accumulated wisdom: the answers it has laboriously developed to
scores of thorny questions.
Doctrinal solutions are nice. But there is a ﬁnal, and still more signiﬁcant,
reason to unify disparate impact law. It is to make section 2 less menacing to
states’ electoral practices and so more likely to be sustained when (not if) its
constitutionality is questioned. At present, it is remarkably easy for a plaintiff to
prevail in a vote denial case if she is able to establish a racial disparity caused by
a particular policy. Her only other obligation is to show that the disparity stems
from the policy’s interaction with past and present discrimination. And almost
always, the disparity does arise for this reason—because the policy raises the cost

10.

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018) (requiring “differences in selection rate” that “are signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical terms”).
11. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982).
12. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (striking down height and weight employment requirements that disproportionately excluded female applicants).
13. See, e.g., Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 432 (1986) (upholding a “29% nonwhite membership
goal” ordered by a district court for a union found to have violated Title VII).
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of voting, and minority citizens who are socioeconomically disadvantaged due
to discrimination are less able to afford the higher price.
Under the usual disparate impact framework, however, the plaintiff would
still have a long road ahead of her. The jurisdiction would have the opportunity
to justify its policy, and if it managed to do so, the plaintiff would have the chance
to identify a comparably effective but less discriminatory alternative. These additional elements, moreover, are no mere formalities. Rather, they explain why
many Title VII and FHA litigants lose their cases14: courts conclude that racial
disparities are justiﬁed and cannot be reduced through other means. If the same
were true in the vote denial context—and there is no reason to think it would not
be—then the uniﬁcation of disparate impact law would slash the success rate of
section 2 plaintiffs.
Paradoxically, this would be good news for advocates of section 2 (a group in
which I count myself). The simpler it is to satisfy section 2, the more it seems
like a pure disparate impact provision: a law that imposes liability solely because
of racial discrepancies. The current Supreme Court is deeply suspicious of such
measures, which in its view “place a racial thumb on the scales” and require defendants to “make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.”15
Conversely, the more closely section 2 hews to the usual doctrinal framework—
with its extra prongs that exculpate justiﬁed racial differences—the more likely
the provision is to be upheld. As the Court recently made clear, when “disparateimpact liability” is “properly limited” so it does not threaten the “displacement
of valid governmental policies,” it poses no constitutional problems.16
Parts I and II of the Article trace the discussion to this point. Part I ﬁrst describes the test that the courts of appeals (and most scholars) have endorsed for
section 2 vote denial claims. The Part then catalogues the doctrinal questions that
remain open about the test, as well as the practical and constitutional concerns
that loom over it. Next, Part II is the Article’s normative core. After introducing
the disparate impact framework used under Title VII, the FHA, and several other

14.

For important studies documenting the low success rates of Title VII and FHA plaintiffs
bringing disparate impact claims, see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006), on Title VII plaintiffs; and Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims
Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013), on FHA plaintiffs.
15. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia is no longer
on the Court, of course, but his views are, if anything, even more widely accepted by the current Justices.
16. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522
(2015).

1573

the yale law journal

128:1566

2019

statutes, the Part argues that this framework is fully transferable to the vote denial context. It then explains how the framework would answer the outstanding
questions about section 2 and resolve the concerns lingering over it.
Part III subsequently considers a number of objections to the Article’s thesis:
that section 2’s text and precedent do not permit the use of the usual doctrinal
framework, that the framework is redundant because it recapitulates the constitutional inquiry, and that litigants’ experience with the framework is so disappointing that it should not be exported anywhere else. There is something to
these points, but they do not ultimately carry the day.
Lastly, Part IV applies the usual framework to three controversial electoral
policies, each emblematic of a separate sort of section 2 case: photo ID requirements for voting (a new franchise restriction), cutbacks to early voting (a reversal of a prior franchise expansion), and all-mail voting (a new franchise expansion). Despite the differences between these measures, the framework is equally
apt for all of them.
i. vote denial doctrine and its defects
Vote denial—the election-law term of art for practices that prevent otherwise-eligible people from voting17—has been around for a very long time. From
the moment of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratiﬁcation, in particular, there have
been efforts to stop African Americans from casting ballots and thus from participating in the political process. Vote denial doctrine under the VRA, though, is
not nearly as deeply rooted as vote denial itself. Indeed, courts have often bemoaned the “paucity of appellate case law evaluating the merits of Section 2
claims in the vote-denial context.”18 It was not until 2014 that the ﬁrst court of
appeals adopted a standard for these challenges, and seven circuits still have not
done so.19
In this Part, I summarize the two-part test around which courts have begun
to coalesce. The test requires that an electoral policy (1) cause a disparate racial

17.

See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 47 (6th ed. 2017)
(deﬁning racial vote denial as “measures that make it more difficult for minority members to
vote or otherwise participate in elections”).
18. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014); see also
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[T]here is little authority on
the proper test to determine whether the right to vote has been denied or abridged on account
of race.”); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“A clear test for Section 2 vote denial claims . . . has yet to emerge.”), vacated as moot, No. 143877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
19. See infra Section I.A.
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impact (2) through the policy’s interaction with social and historical discrimination. I also note the legal academy’s largely positive response to this approach.
Switching from description to critique, I then identify a host of issues that remain unresolved under the test. I further point out several difficulties that can
be expected to intensify if the test continues to be used in its current form. This
legal uncertainty—one might even call it jeopardy—is the basis for this Article’s
call to unify disparate impact law.
A. The Emerging Judicial Consensus
When the VRA was ﬁrst enacted in 1965—after the beatings of protesters in
Selma, Alabama outraged the nation and after a southern ﬁlibuster was broken
in the Senate—the statute was highly focused on vote denial.20 Vote denial,
through poll taxes, literacy tests, and other discriminatory practices, is what motivated the marchers on the Edmund Pettus Bridge and their fellow activists
around the country.21 Vote denial is also what the VRA sought to combat
through several of its provisions. Section 3 authorized the deployment of federal
observers whenever suits were brought to “enforce the voting guarantees of the
fourteenth or ﬁfteenth amendment.”22 Section 4 suspended literacy tests, moral
character requirements, and other similar devices for ﬁve years.23 And section 5
obliged certain southern jurisdictions to obtain federal permission before implementing any new “voting qualiﬁcation or prerequisite to voting.”24
This was “strong medicine,” in the Supreme Court’s words.25 In fact, it was
so potent that jurisdictions wishing to suppress the electoral inﬂuence of minority citizens mostly switched from vote denial to vote dilution.26 Vote dilution,
another election-law term of art, refers to practices that do not prevent anyone

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

For a rich treatment of the VRA’s enactment, see DAVID ARETHA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-

MENT: SELMA AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2008).

See id. at 73-76.
Section 3 is codiﬁed at 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (2018). It originally mentioned only the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3, 79 Stat. 437, 437.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a).
Section 5 is codiﬁed at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018).
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
See id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that as minority citizens increasingly registered to vote and voted, “[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct
attempts to block access to the ballot,” became more common).
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from voting but that nevertheless reduce the clout of minority groups by changing how votes are aggregated.27 Dilutive practices include at-large elections as
well as district plans that inefficiently disperse or concentrate minority voters.
Between roughly the 1970s and the 2000s, these sorts of policies accounted for
the vast majority of voting rights litigation under both the Constitution and the
VRA.28 They were also the measures about which Congress was most concerned
when it amended section 2 in 1982 to make clear the provision could be violated
even in the absence of discriminatory intent.29
But while vote dilution was more salient at the time of section 2’s revision, it
is plain that the provision applies to vote denial, too.30 Subsection (a) covers any
“voting qualiﬁcation or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure”31—language that encompasses both direct and indirect barriers to voting.
Subsection (a) also prohibits the “denial or abridgement of the right . . . to
vote”32—in other words, vote denial or vote dilution. Subsection (b) further explains that section 2 is violated if “the political processes leading to nomination
or election . . . are not equally open to participation by [minority] members,” “in
that [minority] members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process.”33 Vote denial, of course, operates
precisely by impeding such equal participation. And in the authoritative Senate
report that accompanied the amended section 2, Congress conﬁrmed that the

27.
28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.

See LOWENSTEIN ET AL. supra note 17, at 216.
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
11 (2008) (observing that section 2 claims “are dominated by . . . challenges to at-large elections . . . and challenges to reapportionment plans”); Peyton McCrary et al., The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 20, 25 (David L.
Epstein et al. eds., 2006) (ﬁnding the same for section 5). For an empirical examination of the
impact of this vote dilution litigation, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power,
68 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982) (discussing vote dilution almost exclusively).
See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing at length that section 2 applies only to vote denial); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying
Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 441, 442 (2015) (“[T]he text
and legislative history leave no doubt that § 2’s ‘results’ language applies to both vote denial
and vote dilution claims.”).
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 10301(b).
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provision “remains the major statutory prohibition of all voting rights discrimination.”34 It thus “prohibits practices [that] . . . result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral process for minority group members.”35
The few section 2 vote denial cases that were decided in the 1980s, 1990s,
and 2000s failed to yield a consensus as to the proper legal standard.36 Courts
agreed that a racial disparity alone was not enough to establish liability. But they
diverged as to what else might be required. Some courts demanded proof of
proximate causation: proof, that is, that the challenged policy was directly responsible for the disparate impact. If some other variable was signiﬁcantly implicated, then the policy could not be deemed the key driver.37 Other courts emphasized the interaction between the policy and social and historical patterns of
discrimination. On this view, section 2 was breached only if discrimination worsened the present conditions of minority citizens, and these inferior conditions
explained why the policy produced a racial disparity.38 And still other courts insisted on the satisfaction of relevant factors from the 1982 Senate report.39 These
included a legacy of discrimination, socioeconomic differences between minority
and nonminority citizens, and racialized campaigns for office.40
There were few section 2 vote denial cases from the 1980s through the 2000s
because vote denial itself was not very common in this period. Since 2010,
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.

39.
40.

S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30.
Id.
For a longer discussion of these cases, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 4, at 107-09. They likely
failed to produce consensus because of their scarcity; there was simply too little judicial activity.
See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th
Cir. 1997); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306,
310 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]here must be some causal connection between the challenged electoral
practice and the alleged discrimination . . . .”); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352,
1359 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The evidence cast considerable doubt on the existence of a causal link
between the appointive system and Black underrepresentation in Buckingham and Halifax
counties.”).
See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (endorsing “a broad,
functionally-focused review of the evidence to determine whether a challenged voting practice
interacts with surrounding racial discrimination in a meaningful way”); Wesley v. Collins,
791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986).
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (listing “a variety of factors” relevant to “establish[ing] a violation” of section 2).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005); Roberts v.
Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1530 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir.
1989); Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1263 (N.D. Miss.
1987) (“[T]he same language and analysis is applicable to this voter registration case and each
of the relevant [Senate] factors is addressed separately . . . .”).
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though, twenty-three states have implemented new franchise restrictions.41 Thirteen have required identiﬁcation for voting; eleven have limited voter registration; seven have reduced the timespan available for early voting; and three have
delayed the restoration of voting rights for people with criminal convictions.42
These measures amount to the most systematic retrenchment of the right to vote
since the civil rights era. In geographic coverage, indeed, they surpass the franchise restrictions of Jim Crow, since they are in effect nationwide, not conﬁned
to the South.
This resurgence of vote denial has sparked a sharp rise in section 2 vote denial
litigation. Unlike their pre-2010 predecessors, though, courts deciding the recent
wave of cases have managed to agree on the applicable legal standard.43 The
Sixth Circuit was the ﬁrst mover, in a 2014 opinion about Ohio’s cutback to early
voting.44 The court “read the text of Section 2 and the limited relevant case law
as requiring proof of two elements for a vote denial claim.”45 First, the challenged practice “must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class ‘have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process.’”46
Second, “that burden must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and historical
conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination against members of
the protected class.”47
The Seventh Circuit followed closely on the Sixth Circuit’s heels in a 2014
case involving Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement for voting.48 The court
“agree[d] . . . that a Section 2 vote-denial claim consists of two elements,”
41.

42.
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), is one reason for this surge in vote denial. After Shelby County,
formerly covered jurisdictions no longer need to preclear franchise restrictions before implementing them. Another driver is the large number of states in recent years where Republicans
have enjoyed full control of the state government. Scholars have found that franchise restrictions are far more likely to be enacted by Republican administrations than by Democratic
ones. See, e.g., Keith Gunnar Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and
Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1089 (2013).
See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1.
I only discuss appellate decisions here. Sections I.C and I.D address both appellate and trial
court decisions. For other scholars noting the emerging judicial consensus, see Ho, supra note
6, at 808; Karlan, supra note 8, at 767; and Tokaji, supra note 30, at 455.
See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531-32 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
Id. at 554.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (2012), now codiﬁed at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018)).
Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
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though it cautioned that the second step “does not distinguish discrimination by
the defendants from other persons’ discrimination.”49 Next in line was the
Fourth Circuit, in a 2014 decision regarding a North Carolina law that (among
other things) required a photo ID to vote, curbed early voting, and eliminated
same-day voter registration.50 In addition to endorsing the same two-pronged
standard, the court emphasized the relevance of the Senate factors (the nonexclusive list of criteria in the 1982 Senate report) at the second stage of the analysis.51
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit joined the emerging consensus in a 2016
case about Texas’s photo ID requirement.52 It too “adopt[ed] the two-part
framework” and “conclude[d] that the [Senate] factors should be used to help
determine whether there is a sufficient causal link between the disparate burden
imposed and social and historical conditions produced by discrimination.”53 Last
to come on board (so far) was the Ninth Circuit, in a 2016 en banc decision addressing an Arizona law that banned almost anyone other than voters themselves
from returning their early ballots.54 Like its peers, the court “agree[d] with this
two-part framework, which is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, our
own precedent, and with the text of § 2.”55
A few points about this test are worth stressing at this juncture. First, it
builds on the pre-2010 case law about section 2 vote denial claims56—but in a
rather odd way. Instead of selecting one of the earlier approaches, the test essentially embraces them all. The causation of a racial disparity is thus an important
part of the inquiry, but so is a measure’s interaction with social and historical
discrimination, and so too are the various Senate factors. Second, while the test
does not explicitly refer to a jurisdiction’s justiﬁcation for a challenged practice,
one of the Senate factors does bear on this issue. This factor asks “whether the
policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of [the practice] is tenuous.”57 A tenuous policy is tantamount to a weak justiﬁcation and cuts in favor
of liability.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 754-55.
See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 240.
See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225-27 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Id. at 244-45.
See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 371-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Id. at 379.
See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982).
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Third, of the remaining Senate factors, only a few are relevant to vote denial
(as opposed to vote dilution) claims. They are “the extent of any history of official discrimination” with respect to voting, “the extent to which members of the
minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health,” and “whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”58 These factors illuminate the social
and historical discrimination with which a measure must interact to produce its
disparate impact. Last, and most pertinent here, the emerging consensus about
the test’s form masks a number of ﬁerce disagreements about its application. I
turn to these areas of dispute later in this Part.59 They mean that section 2 vote
denial law is much more unsettled than its placid surface suggests.
B. The Academy’s Approval
Before diving into these turbulent waters, though, I note one more zone of
relative harmony: the legal academy. Before the courts of appeals began to embrace their two-part test in 2014, several scholars recommended close to the same
inquiry. In a 2001 article, Stephen Pershing emphasized both the “causal link
that . . . transmits to the voting process the racially disparate effect of some other
social inequality” and the “idea that the Senate Report totality factors [should]
be applied in every section 2 case.”60 In a 2006 piece, Paul Moke and Richard
Saphire called attention to “the interaction between racial disparities in economics, employment, and education and [the challenged policy] that yields an inability to participate in the franchise.”61 And in 2013, Janai Nelson argued that
courts should “examine the historical racial context of discrimination” in order
to “determine whether persistent racial inequality interacts with [disputed] laws
to cause disparate vote denial.”62 All of these commentators should feel vindicated by the emerging judicial consensus, which largely tracks their work.63
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 28-29. These are the factors that most explicitly address discrimination in all its guises.
See also Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 59597 (2013) (highlighting the Senate factors relating to discrimination).
See infra Section I.C.
Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1193-94 (2001).
Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 24 (2006).
Nelson, supra note 58, at 597.
So should Dan Tokaji, who urged in 2006 that “a plaintiff . . . be required to show . . . that
this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged practice’s interaction with social and historical conditions,” Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the
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Since courts arrived at their approach, too, the academic reception has been
highly positive. Voting rights litigator Dale Ho, who has tried several key VRA
cases, has written that “the new two-part test for vote denial liability under Section 2” is “a bulwark against some of the worst attempts at vote denial.”64 As
mentioned earlier,65 Issacharoff and Karlan have each praised the test, describing
it as a “breakthrough”66 that promotes “full civic inclusion for long-excluded
minority citizens.”67 They have also contended that “whether the policy underlying the challenged practice is ‘tenuous’ [should] play[] a more central role” in
the analysis.68 Dan Tokaji has taken an analogous position, labeling the test’s
two prongs “a signiﬁcant improvement” over prior doctrine, and urging that
they be supplemented by a third element that would “balance the harm to minority voters against the state’s proffered interests.”69
I share Issacharoff, Karlan, and Tokaji’s view that courts should more carefully scrutinize the justiﬁcations for the racial disparities caused by electoral practices. But my perspective otherwise diverges from the academic conventional
wisdom.70 As I explain below,71 I do not agree that a measure’s interaction with
social and historical discrimination should be a distinct legal requirement. Nor
do I think the Senate factors deserve the pride of place that has been given to
them. Even as to justiﬁcations, their evaluation should be a separate part of the
inquiry, I believe, not an embellishment of a Senate factor or an open-ended balancing exercise. My stances, I hasten to add, are not simply my personal preferences. Rather, they follow from my commitment to unifying disparate impact
law—to treating section 2 as a subﬁeld of a larger legal domain, not as its own
secluded ﬁefdom. Taking this project seriously means rethinking the judicial
standard for vote denial claims, not just tinkering at its edges.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.

71.

Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 724 (2006), and Dale Ho, who identiﬁed this approach
as an option in 2014, see Ho, supra note 5, at 695-96. I ﬂag Tokaji’s and Ho’s more recent work
in the next paragraph.
Ho, supra note 6, at 823.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 317.
Karlan, supra note 8, at 789.
Id. at 768; see also Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 316 (“[I]n the emerging voting-rights cases,
tenuousness becomes the statutory hook for shifting the inquiry onto the state’s justiﬁcation
for the proposed reform of electoral practices.”).
Tokaji, supra note 30, at 441.
I note, though, that several other scholars have observed (but not pursued) the analogy between Title VII and section 2 vote denial claims. See Ho, supra note 5, at 687; Nelson, supra
note 58, at 587; Tokaji, supra note 63, at 692.
See infra Part II.
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C. Unanswered Questions
But why unify disparate impact law? Why disrupt a status quo that commands general assent from courts and scholars alike? I present the affirmative
case for uniﬁcation (and disruption) in Part II. First, though, in this Section and
the next, I highlight the problems with the doctrine as it currently stands. One
glaring issue is that, to date, the case law has failed to answer basic questions
about the operation of the test for section 2 vote denial claims. These questions
have arisen—repeatedly—in recent suits. But in engaging with them, courts have
taken sharply different tacks and no resolution seems forthcoming.
Moreover, at least some of the blame for the discord may be attributable to
courts’ insistence on analyzing section 2 in isolation, without reference to the rest
of disparate impact law. As I explain later, under Title VII, the FHA, and other
statutes, reasonable answers exist to the questions that have stymied the judiciary under section 2.72 Yet these solutions have been overlooked by courts deciding vote denial cases. Instead, they have marched alone into the fray, indifferent
to the doctrinal progress their peers have made in adjacent areas. Confusion and
conﬂict have been the predictable results.
1. Speciﬁc Practice or Entire System?
To start, what exactly is a section 2 vote denial plaintiff supposed to challenge—a particular electoral practice or a jurisdiction’s integrated system of election administration? Some courts have individually examined a series of
measures, making factual ﬁndings and reaching legal conclusions as to each discrete policy. A North Carolina district court, for example, “considered each challenged electoral mechanism only separately” when confronted with an omnibus
law that regulated voter identiﬁcation, early voting, same-day voter registration,
and several more subjects.73 The Sixth Circuit did the same in a dispute over
Ohio provisions that tightened the identiﬁcation requirements for absentee ballots, shortened the period for ﬁxing absentee-ballot mistakes, and limited pollworker assistance for needy voters.74 As the dissent put it, the court “engage[d]

72.

See infra Section II.C.
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing the district court’s approach).
74. See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2016).

73.
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in a piecemeal freeze frame approach . . . ﬁnding that each new requirement
alone in a vacuum does not meet the standard for disparate impact.”75
Other courts, however, have evaluated the collective result of all the disputed
practices. Assessing the same North Carolina omnibus law, for instance, the
Fourth Circuit “consider[ed] the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect
on minority access to the ballot box.”76 Together, “the panoply of restrictions
results in greater disenfranchisement than any of the law’s provisions individually.”77 Similarly, in a case about Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement, the Seventh
Circuit held that it “must look not at [this requirement] in isolation but to the
entire voting and registration system.”78 Because “blacks do not seem to be disadvantaged by Wisconsin’s electoral system as a whole,” the court upheld the
measure.79
2. Does the Size of the Disparity Matter?
Next, whether one policy or many are at issue, does the disparate racial impact have to reach a certain magnitude before section 2 is violated? An Alabama
district court said yes in a case involving a photo ID requirement, in which the
plaintiffs’ expert estimated that only 1.4%, 2.4%, and 2.3% of white, black, and
Hispanic registered voters, respectively, lacked valid documents.80 The court
thought this “discrepancy in photo ID possession rates” was “miniscule,” and
thus held that “the law has no discriminatory impact.”81 A North Carolina district court followed the same logic in analyzing a ban on counting provisional
ballots cast in the wrong precinct.82 About 0.2% of white voters’ ballots and 0.3%

75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 658 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v.
Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 954-57 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (separately analyzing ﬁve Wisconsin
policies); Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, 189 F. Supp. 3d 708, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
(separately analyzing ﬁve Ohio policies), rev’d, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016).
League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 242.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 231 (4th Cir. 2016).
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.; see also, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 628 (6th Cir. 2016) (treating
an Ohio cutback to early voting as “one component of Ohio’s progressive voting system” and
emphasizing the “many options that remain available to Ohio voters”).
Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
Id. at 1274, 1277.
See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 366 (M.D.N.C.),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014).
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of black voters’ ballots are cast in an incorrect place—a difference that was “minimal,” in the court’s view, and would “not result in unequal access to the polls.”83
Not so, retorted the Fourth Circuit on appeal. “[T]he basic truth [is] that
even one disenfranchised voter—let alone several thousand—is too many.”84
“[W]hat matters for purposes of Section 2 is not how many minority voters are
being denied equal electoral opportunities but simply that ‘any’ minority voter
is being denied . . . .”85 Justice Scalia also suggested that the scale of a racial disparity is immaterial in a vote denial hypothetical he posed in a vote dilution case.
If “a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week,
and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites . . . § 2 would
therefore be violated—even if the number of potential black voters
was . . . small.”86
3. Ability to Comply or Effect on Turnout?
Third, how should a racial difference be measured—in terms of minority and
nonminority citizens’ abilities to comply with a provision, or based on its ultimate effect on voter turnout? In a case about Texas’s photo ID requirement, the
Fifth Circuit “decline[d] to require a showing of lower turnout to prove a Section
2 violation.”87 The court explained that “[a]n election law may keep some voters
from going to the polls,” yet “turnout by different voters might increase for some
other reason.”88 The Fourth Circuit took the same position when African American turnout grew slightly after the North Carolina omnibus law was implemented for one election.89 According to the court, this rise was “beyond the scope
of disproportionate impact analysis” and did not change the reality that “many
African American votes went uncounted.”90
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 367; see also, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 628 (6th Cir.
2016) (“A law cannot disparately impact minority voters if its impact is insigniﬁcant to begin
with.”).
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 408 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 260 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Id.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id.; see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(“[R]aw turnout statistics reveal very little about the disparate burdens that a state’s election
system imposes.”); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-CV-896, 2016 WL
3166251, at *51 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2016) (“Registration and turnout numbers . . . do not tell
the entire story of a group’s access to the polls.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 837 F.3d 612
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In contrast, a dissenting Fifth Circuit judge argued against section 2 liability
unless there was “a link between requiring [photo] IDs for voting and diminished turnout.”91 In the absence of “evidence in the record that anybody was actually prevented from voting,” a vote denial claim should fail.92 Likewise, the
Seventh Circuit sustained Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement in part because it
was unclear “what happened to voter turnout . . . when [the measure] was enforced.”93 The court also wanted to know: “Did the requirement of photo ID
reduce the number of voters below what otherwise would have been expected?”94 “Did that effect differ by race or ethnicity?”95 And “what has happened to voter turnout in the other states . . . that require photo IDs for voting”?96
4. Is Interaction with Discrimination Necessary?
Fourth, must a policy’s disparate racial impact be linked to its interaction
with social and historical discrimination? As discussed above, the emerging judicial consensus insists on such a connection.97 It also regards the Senate factors
as instructive evidence of the discrimination with which a policy must interact.98
But here too there are skeptical voices. The Seventh Circuit, for example, refused
to consider private (as opposed to public) discrimination as well as any socioeconomic differences it may have caused. “[U]nits of government are responsible for their own discrimination but not for rectifying the effects of other persons’ discrimination.”99 Section 2 thus “does not require states to overcome so-

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

(6th Cir. 2016). For scholars also endorsing this position, see Ho, supra note 6, at 809-15;
Karlan, supra note 8, at 768-77; and Tokaji, supra note 30, at 474-76.
Veasey, 830 F.3d at 308 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 314.
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 639 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding Ohio’s cutback to early voting in part because “African Americans’ participation was at
least equal to that of white voters”); N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F.
Supp. 3d 320, 424 (M.D.N.C.) (“[W]hen courts have found § 2 violations, they have frequently grounded that decision in part on lagging minority turnout and registration rates.”),
rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).
See supra Section I.A.
See id.
Frank, 768 F.3d at 753.
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cietal effects of private discrimination that affect the income or wealth of potential voters.”100
A Wisconsin district court also deemed the Senate factors inapplicable. It
observed that they “play a central role in vote-dilution cases,” where they “assist
courts in resolving the tension” between promoting minority representation on
the one hand and avoiding a guarantee of proportional representation on the
other.101 However, “[f]actors developed for this purpose are not necessarily relevant to cases, like this one, that do not present that tension.”102 Interestingly,
the court could point to impeccable legal authority matching its conclusion about
the Senate factors’ inaptness. The Senate report itself declared that vote denial
cases “would not necessarily involve the same factors as the courts have utilized
when dealing with” vote dilution.103
5. Are Minority Preferences a Defense?
Fifth, is it exculpatory if a racial disparity can be ascribed to minority citizens’
subjective preferences (and thus not to a practice’s interaction with social and
historical discrimination)? The Third Circuit thought so in a case involving a
Pennsylvania law that purged registered voters from the rolls if they failed to
vote for two years.104 Minority citizens harmed by the provision, the court reasoned, “have registered to vote at least once, if not more often.”105 “Had they
continued to do so,” instead of choosing not to vote or register, “the purge law
could not have affected them.”106 A North Carolina district court dismissed evidence that minority citizens are more likely than nonminority citizens to use

100.

101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.

Id.; see also, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 306 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (approvingly citing these passages); Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1125
(9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (objecting to the
view that section 2 liability attaches simply because “a disparate impact in an area external to
voting . . . translates into a disparate impact on voting”).
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 869 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982); see also, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,
182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 414 (M.D.N.C.) (“These [Senate] factors are drawn from the vote dilution
context, where they have more obvious application.”), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).
See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 307 (3d
Cir. 1994).
Id. at 315.
Id.
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same-day voter registration on the same basis.107 “That voters preferred to use
[same-day registration] . . . does not mean that without [it] voters lack equal
opportunity.”108
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit again vehemently disagreed. “No mere ‘preference’ led African Americans to disproportionately use early voting, same-day
registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration.”109 “Registration and
voting tools may be a simple ‘preference’ for many white North Carolinians, but
for many African Americans, they are a necessity.”110 The Sixth Circuit also
found it immaterial that black voters’ greater use of straight-ticket voting in
Michigan is due to their “‘tend[ency] to vote overwhelmingly for Democrats.’”111 While this partisan explanation made it “challenging” to say that the
state’s elimination of straight-ticket voting “‘interacts with’ [discriminatory]
conditions” to produce a disparate impact, there was still a probable section 2
violation.112
6. How Does Tenuousness Work?
Sixth, what is the nature of the inquiry into a policy’s tenuousness—the sole
Senate factor relating to a jurisdiction’s justiﬁcation for a practice? For most
courts, tenuousness has been an afterthought, a brief addendum at the end of an
opinion focused on other matters. Here, for instance, is the bulk of the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis of tenuousness in its decision about North Carolina’s omnibus
law: “North Carolina asserts goals of electoral integrity and fraud prevention.
But nothing . . . suggests that those are anything other than merely imaginable.”113 Similarly, this is the sum of what the Sixth Circuit had to say about tenuousness in a case about Ohio’s cutback to early voting: “Under Senate factor

107.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 349 (M.D.N.C.),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769
F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 351.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 246; see also id. at 244 (“Section 2 does not prescribe
a balancing test under which the State can pit its desire for administrative ease against its
minority citizens’ right to vote.”).
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nine, it is also relevant that . . . the policy justiﬁcations for [the cutback] are ‘tenuous.’”114
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit carefully scrutinized the series of interests that
Texas invoked on behalf of its photo ID requirement. These included following
the lead of other states with such provisions, preventing voter fraud, stopping
undocumented immigrants from voting, and bolstering voter conﬁdence.115
Even more rigorous was a North Carolina district court’s inspection of the state’s
justiﬁcations for its omnibus law. This section of the court’s opinion ran to
twenty-ﬁve pages (albeit out of a total of nearly two hundred) and exhaustively
explained why each measure had a valid rationale.116 For these courts, tenuousness was plainly no postscript; rather, its absence was effectively an element of
the cause of action.
7. What Is the Remedy?
Lastly, what relief should be granted when a policy breaches section 2? Several courts have concluded that “the proper remedy . . . is invalidation”117 and
thus have permanently enjoined practices from being used in the future. A permanent injunction was the fate of, among others, Ohio’s cutback to early voting,118 North Carolina’s omnibus law,119 and Michigan’s ban on straight-ticket
voting.120 “[A]n injunction is the only practicable remedy,” elaborated a Wisconsin district court.121 “[S]urely it would make little sense to allow Blacks and Latinos to vote without” complying with a provision, “while continuing to require
white voters” to abide by it.122
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 557 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as
moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014); see also, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17
F. Supp. 3d 837, 878 (E.D. Wis.) (“There is nothing in the text of Section 2 indicating that the
state’s interest is relevant . . . .”), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 440-65 (M.D.N.C.),
rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 239 (adding that different relief may be appropriate when no discriminatory intent is found).
See Husted, 768 F.3d at 560-61.
See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 239-41.
See Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 669 (6th Cir. 2016).
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 879 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. Also, notably, a district court recently held that its earlier invalidation of Wisconsin’s cutback to early voting barred the State from trying again to limit the early-voting period. See
One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp, 2019 WL 254093, at *2-5 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17,
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No court has ordered such racially differential relief. A number of courts,
though, have ruled that measures should be softened when they contravene section 2—relaxed for minority and nonminority citizens alike—not struck down in
their entirety. In a case about Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement, for example,
the Seventh Circuit stated that courts’ “remedial authority is limited to ending
the illegal conduct,” which “is not photo ID in the abstract, but how income and
education affect the probability of having photo ID.”123 Therefore, “[t]he injunction should . . . allow[] the state an opportunity to make photo ID more readily
available.”124 Likewise, in another photo ID case, the Fifth Circuit opined that
“[s]imply reverting to the system in place before [the law’s] passage would not
fully respect [Texas’s] policy choices.”125 Accordingly, “[t]he remedy must be
tailored to rectify only the discriminatory effect on those voters who do not have
[photo] ID or are unable to reasonably obtain such identiﬁcation.”126
D. Looming Concerns
These unanswered questions, it is fair to say, are no mere tangents. On the
contrary, they strike at the heart of the emerging test for section 2 vote denial
claims. They mean that fundamental issues about both of the test’s prongs remain unresolved. They mean that courts lack concrete guidance as to matters
that recur in almost every case. And, most relevant here, they mean that little
deference is due to the judicial consensus in favor of the test. Superﬁcial agreement that is, in fact, a facade for stark division is hardly worth heeding.127

123.
124.

125.
126.

127.

2019). These cases, though, should not be read as forever barring states from adopting certain
policies. If circumstances signiﬁcantly changed, presumably the enjoined measures could lawfully be reenacted.
Frank, 768 F.3d at 755.
Id. Since Frank, as suggested by this passage, the district court has suggested that “the appropriate remedy” for “those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort” is “to allow those
voters to present an affidavit in lieu of photo identiﬁcation.” Frank v. Walker, 196 F. Supp. 3d
893, 916 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 271 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Id.; see also, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 963 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(holding that Wisconsin’s photo ID petition process is unlawful but “does not require wholesale invalidation”).
Of course, there also exist unanswered questions about many other areas of law. See, e.g.,
Christopher S. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 604-27 (2016)
(describing outstanding issues in vote dilution doctrine). The questions about vote denial law,
though, are unusual in their number, in their signiﬁcance, and in that they have been answered
by the broader ﬁeld of disparate impact law.
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Beyond the unanswered questions, there is a practical problem with the
courts’ two-part test, which then leads to a legal problem. The practical problem
is that the test is too easy to satisfy. Many aspects of states’ electoral systems
cause racial disparities, and almost all of them are suspect under the test. The
consequent legal problem is that if the test assigns liability this readily, then it
puts section 2 in serious constitutional danger. It widens the gap between violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (which require a discriminatory purpose128) and breaches of section 2 (which take little more than a disparate impact), thus undermining section 2’s congruence and proportionality with
the Amendments. It also encourages jurisdictions to consider race when administering their elections, thus heightening the tension between section 2 and the
Equal Protection Clause.129
To see why the test threatens so many practices, start with its ﬁrst prong.
Minority citizens tend to be substantially more affected than nonminority citizens by a host of common regulations of voting. In states with voter registration
(which is almost all of them130), minority citizens generally register at lower
rates.131 In states that disenfranchise felons (again, almost all of them),132 minority citizens more frequently lose their right to vote.133 In the twelve states that

128.
129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (Fifteenth Amendment); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment).
This legal problem exists no matter how the questions in Section I.C are answered. However
those issues are resolved, the courts’ two-part test continues to lack the justiﬁcation defense
that is critical for not reaching far beyond racially discriminatory intent and not overly racializing election administration.
The only exception is North Dakota. See North Dakota . . . . The Only State Without Voter Registration, N.D. SECRETARY ST. (Aug. 2017), https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/portals/votereg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2TG-9ZAU].
See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580
.html [https://perma.cc/J38V-ARHU] (reporting 2016 voter registration rates of 72% for
white citizens, 69% for black citizens, and 57% for Hispanic citizens).
Only in Maine and Vermont can incarcerated felons vote. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns
/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/8RZ2-KN6A].
See Erin Kelley, Racism and Felony Disenfranchisement: An Intertwined History, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. 1 (May 19, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications
/Disenfranchisement_History.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4DB-RWCD]. I do not focus on
felon disenfranchisement in this Article because courts have mostly concluded that, unlike
other electoral practices, it is either wholly beyond the reach of section 2 or unlawful only if
linked to racially discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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do not offer early voting,134 minority citizens would be more likely to vote before
Election Day if this option were available.135 Across the country, minority citizens are less apt to have driver’s licenses, and so less able to take advantage of
motor-voter registration.136 Also nationwide, as a dissenting Fifth Circuit judge
has observed, minority citizens are “disproportionately affect[ed]” by “polling
locations,” “mail-in ballots,” “language on absentee ballots,” “the number of
vote-counting machines a county must have,” and even “holding elections on
Tuesday.”137 With respect to any of these measures, a racial disparity could be
established without much difficulty, and a plaintiff could therefore advance to
the test’s second prong.
This second element—the attribution of a policy’s disparate impact to its interaction with social and historical discrimination—is the one that meaningfully
restricts the test’s reach according to backers of the emerging consensus. In the
words of the Fifth Circuit, it is a “sufficient and familiar way to limit courts’ interference . . . to [practices] that truly have a discriminatory impact.”138 Or as
Ho has written, “[T]he second prong ‘limit[s] liability only to claims where a
challenged law has a particularly burdensome racial effect.’”139
Yet of all the recent section 2 vote denial decisions, only one seems to have
found a racial disparity but then concluded that it was not the result of a measure’s interaction with discrimination. As mentioned above, a North Carolina district court determined that black citizens are more likely to use same-day voter
registration but that this proclivity stems from their idiosyncratic preferences.140
In every other case, if a court discerned a disparate impact, it also managed to
134.

135.

136.

137.
138.
139.

140.

Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ncsl
.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc
/L8A8-BNZS].
Cf. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (stating for this reason that
“acceptance of Plaintiffs’ argument that the eight days of early voting allowed by the Florida
legislature violates Section 2 could have far-reaching implications”); Jacksonville Coal. for
Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335-36 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (similar).
See Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 601 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[M]otor-voter registration would be found to be invalid as members of the protected class were less likely to
possess a driver’s license.”); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 754 (7th Cir. 2014).
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 310 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 247 (majority opinion).
Ho, supra note 6, at 804 (quoting Ho, supra note 5, at 703); see also, e.g., Karlan, supra note 8,
at 767 (arguing that the second prong, which is a critical part of the totality of the circumstances, prevents the test from “render[ing] virtually every electoral rule vulnerable”).
See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 351 (M.D.N.C.),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769
F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014).
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link that impact to past and present discrimination, as illuminated by the Senate
factors.141 In every other case, that is, the probability of the test’s second prong
being satisﬁed, conditional on its ﬁrst prong having been met, was one hundred
percent. (And even in the North Carolina litigation, the district court’s decision
was eventually reversed on appeal, precisely because it was interaction with discrimination that, in the Fourth Circuit’s view, explained black citizens’ penchant
for same-day registration.)142
The elements’ near-perfect correlation should not be surprising. When an
electoral policy causes a racial disparity, it almost never does so at random—because a condition for voting just happens to be associated with race. Rather, the
causal chain connecting the policy with the disparity almost always includes a
role for social and historical discrimination. Discrimination helps explain minority citizens’ worse education, higher poverty, and greater residential isolation.
These socioeconomic disadvantages, in turn, help explain why minority citizens
are less likely to register to vote, to have photo IDs, to vote on Election Day, and
so on. To put the point another way: discrimination is generally a reason why
minority citizens participate in the political process at lower rates. But precisely
because it is generally a reason, requiring it to be shown adds little to requiring
proof of a disparate impact alone. The impact’s causal mechanism is present
about as often as the impact itself.143
Now turn from the operation of the courts’ test to its validity. From a constitutional perspective, two concerns arise if the test’s nominally separate prongs in
fact collapse into a single inquiry.144 First, section 2 may then exceed Congress’s
141.

See, e.g., Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 668-69 (6th Cir.
2016); Veasey, 830 F.3d at 256-64; League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 245-47; Ohio
State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as
moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. 2014); One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F.
Supp. 3d 896, 957-60 (W.D. Wis. 2016); N.E. Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted,
No. 2:06-CV-896, 2016 WL 3166251, at *49-53 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2016), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016); Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, 189 F. Supp. 3d 708,
759-62 (S.D. Ohio), rev’d, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837,
877-79 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). This sample size is not enormous
(amounting to just eight decisions), but it is still quite suggestive of the second prong’s limited independent value.
142. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016).
143. For another scholar making this point (albeit in the constitutional context), see Michael J.
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 558
(1977) (“Laws having a disproportionate racial impact burden blacks because of their especially
disadvantaged position in American society.”).
144. To be clear, these concerns would only threaten section 2 itself (as opposed to the two-part
test enforcing it) if section 2 necessarily required the test to be used. I explain below why
neither section 2’s text nor the cases construing the provision compels the test’s use. See infra
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enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.145 Under these
Amendments, according to the Supreme Court, there must be “congruence and
proportionality” between Congress’s chosen means and the “injury to be prevented or remedied.”146 And in the Court’s view, the only harm to be avoided or
cured in this area is intentional racial discrimination.147 The test may thus be
noncongruent and disproportionate because it prohibits a broad swath of conduct that is constitutionally innocuous: governmental activity that lacks a discriminatory purpose but produces a disparate impact. As a dissenting former
Ninth Circuit judge has argued, the test “destroys section 2’s congruence and
proportionality” if it is breached by “nothing but [racial] disparities.”148
Second, if that is all it takes to infringe section 2, then jurisdictions may have
to take race into account whenever they change (or maintain) their electoral regulations. They may have to analyze each potential (or existing) law’s racial effects, and depending on what they ﬁnd, they may even have to adopt race-based
policies in order to avoid liability. But in a pivotal 2015 case, Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court
warned that if a statute “cause[s] race to be used and considered in a pervasive
way,” “serious constitutional questions then could arise” under the Equal Protection Clause.149 The statute could offend the equal protection principle of

145.

146.

147.
148.

149.

Section III.A. Thus, if these constitutional arguments were accepted, their implication would
be not the invalidation of section 2 but rather judicial insistence that some other standard
(presumably more like the usual framework) be deployed instead to determine vote denial
liability. Cf. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (construing section 2 narrowly in the
vote dilution context in order to “avoid[] serious constitutional questions”).
Under the Elections Clause, on the other hand, there is no reason why Congress could not
enact a pure disparate impact provision. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,
570 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013) (discussing Congress’s near-plenary authority under Article I, Section
4 of the Constitution). But the Elections Clause applies only to congressional elections, and
thus cannot rescue section 2 with respect to elections at any other level. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 4, cl. 1.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). Strictly speaking, City of Boerne dealt only
with the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the Fifteenth Amendment standard undetermined.
See also Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (declining again to
specify the Fifteenth Amendment test).
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). City of Boerne itself involved this same combination of essentially
a pure effects test and a constitutional provision requiring discriminatory intent. See 521 U.S.
at 529-36. So did Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-91 (2000). There is thus
ample precedent for the proposition that naked disparate impact laws are not congruent and
proportional responses to constitutional violations based on invidious motives.
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015); see also id. at 2522 (noting “the serious constitutional questions
that might arise . . . if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical
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colorblindness by, as Justice Scalia put it on a different occasion, “plac[ing] a
racial thumb on the scales” and “requiring [jurisdictions] to evaluate the racial
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those
racial outcomes.”150 Echoing these sentiments, a Fifth Circuit dissenter criticized
the courts’ test precisely because of the excessive race consciousness it allegedly
induces. The test, she claimed, “will force considerations of race on state lawmakers who will endeavor to avoid litigation by eliminating any perceived racial
disparity in voting regulations.”151
Of course, these constitutional objections are not universally shared. Numerous observers (myself included) think it is perfectly permissible, if not necessarily advisable, for Congress to ban electoral practices solely because of the racial
discrepancies they cause.152 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s contrary position
is the law of the land. It therefore behooves supporters of section 2 to think of
ways to restrict its reach—to prevent it from imposing liability in almost all circumstances where policies produce disparate impacts. The next Part turns to that
project, on which the continuing viability of the VRA’s most important remaining provision may hinge.153

150.
151.
152.

153.

disparity”). This concern has also been raised in section 2 vote dilution cases. See, e.g., League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (criticizing approaches that
“would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions”).
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 317 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting).
For an example of a court defending section 2’s constitutionality, see id. at 253 (majority opinion). For an example of a scholar doing the same, see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998).
The reason why a pure disparate impact provision may be imprudent, even if lawful, is that it
prioritizes the avoidance of racial disparities above other legitimate governmental goals. See
infra Part II.
As noted earlier, see supra note 3, the VRA’s other key provision, section 5, was effectively
nulliﬁed in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Shelby County also makes clear that
the constitutional threat to section 2 is far from speculative. Indeed, the Court’s decision
pointedly referred to section 2’s “permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting” without affirming the provision’s validity. Id. at 2631. Moreover, while section 5 was repeatedly upheld prior to Shelby County, the Court has never found section 2 to be constitutional—not even in a vote dilution case. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has “assum[ed] but never directly address[ed] its constitutionality”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (identifying the open “question whether § 2 . . . is consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution”).
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ii. unifying disparate impact law
In principle, there are several ways in which section 2’s scope could be narrowed.154 But in practice, only one approach has been used by American antidiscrimination law to cabin disparate impact liability: what I call the usual disparate impact framework, or the usual framework for short. Under the usual framework (as under the courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote denial claims), the
plaintiff must prove that a practice causes a racial disparity. But next under the
usual framework (unlike under the two-part test), the defendant has the opportunity to show that the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial interest. And
then under the usual framework (again unlike under the two-part test), the
plaintiff may try to demonstrate that this interest could be attained through different means that yield smaller racial differences.
In this Part, I ﬁrst present the usual framework, emphasizing its use in every
area of disparate impact law other than voting. Next, I contend that the usual
framework is fully applicable to the electoral context. Historically, theoretically,
and substantively, the usual framework ﬁts voting as well as—perhaps better
than—any other ﬁeld. Lastly, I return to the unanswered questions and looming
concerns I previously identiﬁed with respect to the emerging section 2 consensus. The usual framework, I maintain, responds effectively to the questions by
drawing on decades of judicial experience. It also resolves the concerns by limiting section 2 to unwarranted racial disparities.
It is important to note, too, that my argument is not an all-or-nothing proposition. It is quite possible for vote denial law to adopt some of the usual framework while declining to embrace other components. To be sure, complete uniﬁcation is more doctrinally elegant, and applies to section 2 more of the hard-won
lessons of other domains. But partial uniﬁcation is more doctrinally realistic—
given the amount of precedent that has already accumulated—and still brings to
section 2 much external wisdom. The perfect thus need not be the enemy of the
good here. The weak form of my thesis is a perfectly viable (if not, in my view,
equally beneﬁcial) alternative to the strong version.

154.

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992 (2019) (arguing for the balancing of racial disparities against
defendants’ countervailing interests in place of the usual framework’s multistep approach).
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A. The Usual Framework
The concept of disparate impact discrimination ﬁrst entered American law
in the breakthrough 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.155 The Supreme Court
confronted a pair of hiring requirements—possession of a high-school diploma
and a satisfactory score on an aptitude test—that were not adopted with a “racial
purpose or invidious intent” but that did “render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of Negroes.”156 The Court held that such criteria violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act unless they are “shown to be related to job performance” or to “business necessity.”157 The Court explained that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.”158 Title VII thus compels the “removal of artiﬁcial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment”—an end to policies that “operate
as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.”159
As these quotes from Griggs illustrate, the Court meant from the outset to
conﬁne Title VII to racial disparities that could not be justiﬁed by employers.
This aim was formalized in the Court’s next encounter with the disparate impact
theory: the 1975 case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.160 The Court ruled that
“the complaining party or class” must ﬁrst “ma[k]e out a prima facie case of
discrimination” by showing that “the tests in question select applicants for hire
or promotion in a racial pattern signiﬁcantly different from that of the pool of
applicants.”161 If a prima facie case is established, the “burden” then shifts to the
employer to “prov[e] that its tests are ‘job related.’”162 The employer prevails if
155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.

401 U.S. 424 (1971). In an interesting twist, one of the only precedents on which the Court
relied in Griggs, see id. at 430, was an early vote denial case, Gaston County v. United States, 395
U.S. 285 (1969), where the Court struck down a literacy test not because it was enacted with
discriminatory intent but, rather, because it extended educational inequality to the voting domain. See 395 U.S. at 297 (“‘Impartial’ administration of the literacy test today would serve
only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form.”).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
Id. at 431; see also id. at 432 (“[A]ny given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question.”).
Id. at 432.
Id. at 431, 432.
422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 35 (1980) (observing that Albemarle set forth the disparate impact
framework “in terms of the process of litigation, with plaintiff’s surrebuttal element a new
step in the structure”).
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
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it demonstrates job relatedness unless “the complaining party [can] show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”163
In the decades following Albemarle, the Court repeatedly reﬁned the case’s
three-step approach. I discuss some of these doctrinal developments later in this
Part.164 For a period in the late 1980s, the Court also veered closer to reversal
than to reﬁnement. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, in particular, the Court
diluted the justiﬁcation inquiry to merely “whether a challenged practice
serves . . . the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”165 The Court
switched the burden allocation between the parties as well, such that “[t]he burden of persuasion . . . remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff . . . ‘at all
times.’”166
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, Congress emphatically rejected
these aspects of Wards Cove and restored the usual framework.167 Under the Act
(as under Albemarle), “a complaining party [must] demonstrate[] that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact.”168 If this showing is made, the respondent may try to “demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity.”169 If this showing is made too, the complaining party
may offer an “alternative employment practice” that is similarly job related and
consistent with business necessity, but that produces a smaller racial disparity.170
Congress has never revisited this language, so it remains the operative standard
for disparate impact liability under Title VII.
In fact, it remains much more than that. Title VII’s burden-shifting approach
has served as the template for how disparate impact liability is determined in
every other area (except voting) that recognizes the theory. Consider the Fair

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

168.
169.
170.

Id.
See infra Section II.C.
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The decision then notes that “[t]he touchstone of this inquiry is a
reasoned review of the employer’s justiﬁcation for his use of the challenged practice.” Id.
Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2018). For a helpful piece on
the Act’s enactment, written by some of the key players in the drama, see Peter M. Leibold et
al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in
1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
Id.
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
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Housing Act.171 After decades in which many courts of appeals chose to employ
the usual framework,172 the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) ratiﬁed their decisions in a 2013 regulation.173 Under the HUD rule, “the
plaintiff . . . has the burden of proving that the challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”174 Next, the “defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”175 Finally, the “plaintiff
may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests . . . could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”176 “[T]his burden-shifting scheme,” HUD pointed out in an accompanying statement, “is consistent with the Title VII discriminatory effects
standard codiﬁed by Congress in 1991.”177
The Supreme Court considered the HUD rule in Inclusive Communities, the
2015 case about whether the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.178 The
Court not only held that the FHA does so; it also endorsed the usual framework
(as articulated in the HUD rule) while explicitly linking the FHA to Title VII.
“The cases interpreting Title VII . . . provide essential background and instruction,” the Court declared.179 “These cases . . . teach that disparate-impact liability must be limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make
the practical business choices . . . that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”180 The Title VII precedents also establish that “before rejecting a
business justiﬁcation—or, in the case of a governmental entity, an analogous

171.
172.

173.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

The relevant statutory provisions are codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a).
See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11460, 11462 (Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter FHA Implementation] (codiﬁed largely at 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500 (2018)) (noting that “HUD has always used a three-step burden-shifting approach,
as do many federal courts of appeals”).
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. More recently, HUD has asked for comments as to whether this regulation should be revisited in light of Inclusive Communities. See Reconsideration of HUD’s
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 28560
(June 20, 2018).
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11474.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015);
see also id. at 2514-15, 2522-23 (citing the HUD rule approvingly).
Id. at 2518.
Id.; see also id. at 2522 (noting that this justiﬁcation inquiry “is analogous to the business necessity standard under Title VII”).
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public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is”
a less discriminatory alternative.181 “[T]he Title VII framework may not transfer
exactly to the fair-housing context, but the comparison suffices for present purposes.”182
Or take Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enacted at the same time as
Title VII and prohibiting recipients of federal funds from engaging in racial discrimination.183 Title VI itself bars only intentional discrimination,184 but agencies implementing the provision “may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups.”185 Pursuant to this authority, twenty-six
agencies have issued disparate impact regulations.186 Virtually all of these rules,
according to the Department of Justice’s Title VI Legal Manual, have adopted
the usual framework:
First, does the adverse effect of the policy or practice disproportionately
affect members of a group identiﬁed by race[?] . . . If so, can the recipient
demonstrate the existence of a substantial legitimate justiﬁcation for the
policy or practice? . . . Finally, is there an alternative that would achieve
the same legitimate objective but with less of a discriminatory effect?187
These “elements of a Title VI disparate impact claim,” the Manual adds, “are
similar to the analysis of cases decided under Title VII” and “under the Fair
Housing Act.”188
The usual framework is also employed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).189 As the Supreme Court has held, “employment criteria” that cause an “adverse impact on older workers as a group” are unlawful

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.

Id. at 2518.
Id. at 2523.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codiﬁed at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (2018)).
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
Id. at 281.
See Civil Rights Div., Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T JUST. § 7, at 3 (2017), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/case-document/ﬁle/934826/download [https://perma.cc/57RX-48BH].
Id. at 6.
Id.; see id. at 3 n.2 (“Cases decided under Title VII or the Fair Housing Act may be instructive.”); see also Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 286 (2006) (noting that, even in the absence of agency guidelines, courts “develop[ed] Title VI’s balancing defense” by “following the Supreme Court’s
three-step formulation for Title VII disparate impact cases”).
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018).
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unless “the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that was ‘reasonable.’”190 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) uses the usual framework
as well.191 In the words of a statement jointly promulgated by eight federal agencies, “lending discrimination under the ECOA” is established “when a lender
applies a practice uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory
effect . . . and is not justiﬁed by business necessity.”192 The usual framework further extends to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).193 The statute itself
bans employment criteria that “screen out . . . a class of individuals with disabilities” unless the criteria are “job-related” and “consistent with business necessity.”194 The usual framework even reaches beyond American shores. In a comparative study, Rosemary Hunter and Elaine Shoben write that “since the United
States Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact theory of discrimination in
Griggs, the theory has spread to every major common law jurisdiction and into
Western Europe and the international arena.”195
In sum, there currently exist two standards for assigning disparate impact
liability. There is the usual framework, which governs the ﬁelds of employment,
housing, age discrimination, lending discrimination, and disability discrimination, as well as the many additional contexts in which private or public entities
receive federal funds. And there is the courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote
denial claims. This Article’s thesis, again, is that only one disparate impact standard is actually necessary—and that it should be the usual framework that is kept,
not the courts’ emerging section 2 test. The rest of this Part defends this position,
relying in particular on employment law and housing law: the areas where the
disparate impact theory has been most fully developed.
190.

191.
192.

193.
194.
195.

Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239, 241 (2005); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 100-02 (2008) (elaborating on the ADEA’s reasonableness defense).
Of course, the ADEA’s reference to “reasonable factors other than age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1),
is not identical to the usual framework’s justiﬁcation defense. It nevertheless captures the
same idea: that employment practices that cause disparate impacts should be upheld when
they can be explained by the defendant.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2018).
Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266, 18268 (Apr. 15, 1994);
see also FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11474 (noting that HUD’s approach to disparate impact claims under the FHA “is also consistent with the discriminatory effects standard
under ECOA, which borrows from Title VII’s burden-shifting framework” (footnote omitted)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2018).
Id.; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (holding that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA”).
Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimination: American Oddity
or Internationally Accepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 108, 124 (1998).
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B. Applicability to Voting
How might we determine if the usual framework is applicable to voting? The
text of section 2 could resolve the matter if it, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
referred explicitly to racial disparities, countervailing interests, and alternative
practices.196 Section 2, though, is silent as to how liability should be imposed in
vote denial cases. A Supreme Court decision akin to Albemarle for Title VII, or
Inclusive Communities for the FHA, could also specify the right approach in this
domain. But the Court has never evaluated a franchise restriction (or expansion)
under section 2.
In the absence of any binding authority, several factors seem relevant to the
usual framework’s applicability to voting. One is the legislative histories of Title
VII, the FHA, and section 2. These provisions’ drafting might illuminate how
Congress expected them to operate with respect to racial discrepancies—and
whether Congress had a single expectation or several. Another consideration is
disparate impact theory. There are competing accounts of this body of law, which
could converge or point in different directions for employment, housing, and
voting. And a third issue is the nature of the activity. Working for pay, ﬁnding
shelter, and casting a ballot are all vital aspects of membership in American society, which may require one or more legal standards when they give rise to racial
gaps.197
1. Legislative Histories
In my view, each of these factors supports the usual framework’s validity for
voting. Begin with the legislative histories of Title VII, the FHA, and section 2.
These measures were passed within a few years of one another in the 1960s and
represent some of that era’s greatest statutory achievements. Title VII came ﬁrst
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the monumental law that John F. Kennedy’s assassination and Lyndon B. Johnson’s political genius made possible.198 Section 2
was next: a pillar of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the statute that Congress

196.

See infra Section III.A.
I note that my argument in this section is primarily descriptive: that voting is sufficiently
similar to employment and housing that the usual framework can be applied to it. I develop
my normative claim—that the usual framework should be applied to voting—in the next two
Sections. See infra Sections II.C, II.D.
198. For a colorful series of essays on the Act’s passage, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE
PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997).

197.
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enacted in the wake of the appalling violence in Selma.199 And last in the trio was
the Fair Housing Act, ratiﬁed in 1968 after yet another tragedy: the murder of
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the spasm of inner-city fury his death unleashed.200
Title VII, the FHA, and section 2 were close in spirit as well as in time. Their
shared mission was to break down entrenched patterns of racial stratiﬁcation in
the economic and political spheres. Indeed, it was precisely because of their interest in “the consequences of [challenged] practices, not simply the motivation,” as the Supreme Court put it in Griggs, that all three provisions were construed to authorize disparate impact claims.201 The 1963 House report on Title
VII thus described in detail the large racial differences in wages and joblessness
that then existed.202 One of Title VII’s goals was to loosen “the economic straitjacket in which the Negro has been conﬁned”—to raise “the economic standards
of the Negro population” by ending “this severe inequality in employment.”203
Likewise, in a speech subsequently quoted by the Supreme Court, the FHA’s
principal sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale, stated that the law aimed to “replace
the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”204 His counterpart on the House side, Representative Emanuel Celler, agreed that the FHA
meant to “remove the walls of discrimination which enclose minority groups”
and to end “the blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.”205 The
VRA, too, was directed at not just purposeful racial discrimination in voting but

199.

As I discuss below, section 2’s revision in 1982 was substantially more important than its enactment in 1965. See infra Section III.A.
200. For a good account of the FHA’s legislative history, see Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing:
A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
201. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 27 (1963) (additional views of Rep. William M. McCulloch et
al.) (noting that “[i]n 1962, nonwhites made up 11 percent of the civilian labor force, but 22
percent of the unemployed,” and that “among Negroes who are employed, their jobs are
largely concentrated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations”).
203. Id. at 27-28; see also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (noting that Title
VII was “designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII makes plain
the purpose of Congress . . . to eliminate . . . racially stratiﬁed job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”).
204. 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter F. Mondale) (“[W]e are [no longer]
going to live separately in white ghettos and Negro ghettos . . . .”); see also Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting Senator Mondale).
205. 114 CONG. REC. 9559, 9563 (1968) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler); see also Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (“Recognition of disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA’s central purpose . . . to eradicate
discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s economy.”).
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also “the present white-Negro registration disparity.”206 A literacy test could
therefore be an illegal “barrier to the franchise,” according to the 1965 Senate
report, if its racially unequal effect was unintentional yet still “a result of recent
legal separation of the races in education.”207
Crucially, however, none of these statutes was maximalist in its ambitions,
bent on eradicating racial discrepancies at any cost. Rather, the drafters of all
three laws took the more moderate position that the struggle against racial stratiﬁcation, while important, must be balanced against other legitimate objectives.
The House report on Title VII, for instance, stressed that the provision would
not “promot[e] equality with mathematical certainty” or “impose forced racial
balance upon employers or labor unions.”208 To the contrary, “management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed” as long as “jobs in
companies or membership in unions are strictly ﬁlled on the basis of qualiﬁcation.”209
When Congress revised the FHA in 1988, similarly, the House report on the
amendments “recognized that liability should not attach when a justiﬁcation is
necessary to the covered entity’s business.”210 In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court repeatedly cited this report as support for its decision to apply the
usual framework to FHA disparate impact claims.211 And as for section 2, not
only is one of the factors recognized by the 1982 Senate report the tenuousness
of the government’s rationale for a policy,212 but the measure itself states that it
206.

S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 16 (1965) (joint views of twelve members of the Judiciary Committee); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966) (observing that in
several southern states, “registration of voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points
or more ahead of Negro registration”).
207. S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 32-33 (additional views of Sen. Thomas J. Dodd et al.); see also id.
at 33 (objecting to the poll tax regardless of its intent because it is “a far heavier economic
burden on Negroes than on whites”).
208. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (additional views of Rep. William M. McCulloch et al.).
209. Id.; see also Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 333 (1983) (noting
that “both proponents and opponents of the Act agreed that Title VII did not mandate a rigid
kind of distributive equality”). When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it conﬁrmed that
the provision “does not prohibit all practices with a discriminatory effect, however, only those
that are not justiﬁed by business necessity.” S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 40 (1990).
210. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11472 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 30 (1988)).
211. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 251921 (2015).
212. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (asking “whether the policy underlying the [practice] is
tenuous”). It follows from the inclusion of this factor that there exist some policies that are
not tenuous—that there are some excuses that can justify impositions on the rights protected
by section 2.
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does not require perfect racial balancing. “[N]othing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population,”213 reads the “compromise disclaimer” that enabled the bill’s passage.214
Accordingly, the legislative histories of Title VII, the FHA, and section 2 resemble one another in two key respects. They establish that the provisions may
be violated by racial disparities even in the absence of discriminatory intent. And
they hold that liability does not necessarily follow from such disparities, depending instead on what interests the challenged practices serve and how well they
serve them.215 The usual framework captures both of these themes by including
a prima facie case, based on disparate impact alone, that may then be rebutted
by a sufficiently compelling and tailored justiﬁcation. The courts’ two-part test
for section 2 vote denial claims, on the other hand, is true to the ﬁrst theme but
not the second. As explained earlier,216 the test comes too close to ﬁnding a
breach whenever an electoral policy differentially affects minority and nonminority citizens—even if it does so for good reason.
2. Theoretical Accounts
Turn next to the theoretical accounts of disparate impact law. Its essence,
from one perspective, is the removal of obstacles that unjustiﬁably prevent racial
minority members from enjoying the same opportunities as nonminority members. By lowering these hurdles, disparate impact law is supposed to improve
conditions for minorities, to prevent their existing disadvantages from spreading
into new areas, and ultimately to undermine the racial hierarchies of American
society.217 This is the model the Griggs Court embraced when it condemned “artiﬁcial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that “operate as ‘built-in headwinds’
213.
214.

215.

216.
217.

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).
See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 95 (additional views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (noting “the euphoria
generated by the proposed ‘compromise,’ virtually ensuring the swift enactment of this measure”).
See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 16 (1987) (noting that, in passing Title VII, Congress both “was intent
on securing visible and measurable improvement in employment of minorities” and “did not
want jobs to be allocated mechanically to members of various groups by reference to population or labor force”).
See supra Section I.D.
For examples of scholars discussing this account, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact
and the Role of Classiﬁcation and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1132 (2016) (“Others have seen [disparate impact’s] function
as more distributive—as aiming to overcome an unfair group-based distribution of jobs or
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for minority groups.”218 Hints of the model are also apparent in Inclusive Communities, which quoted this language from Griggs219 and further criticized policies that “arbitrarily creat[e] discriminatory effects or perpetuat[e] segregation.”220
Another account of disparate impact law sees it as a way to target racially
discriminatory motives that are suspected but cannot directly be proven. On this
view, few contemporary defendants are so foolish as to create records that reveal
their invidious objectives. In the absence of smoking guns, discriminatory intent
must be inferred from circumstantial evidence. And perhaps the most probative
such evidence is a signiﬁcant racial disparity, caused by a particular practice, that
could have been avoided without compromising any legitimate interest.221 Justice Scalia characterized disparate impact law in these terms in a 2009 concurrence, “framing it as simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment.”222 The
Inclusive Communities Court also gestured in this direction, observing that “disparate-impact liability . . . plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent.”223
A third model of disparate impact law, recently developed by Joseph Fishkin,
emphasizes its ability to eliminate (or at least widen) bottlenecks in American
life.224 A bottleneck is a criterion that is applied to a certain pool of people and
that allocates a desired good to only a subset of them. A bottleneck produces a
racial disparity if it is harder for minority members to pass through it than for
nonminority members. And whenever a bottleneck is lifted (or loosened), the

218.
219.
220.
221.

222.
223.

224.

other resources.”); and Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1341, 1376 (2010) (“[D]isparate impact doctrine can be understood . . . as intended to redress
self-perpetuating racial hierarchies inherited from the past . . . .”).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522,
2524 (2015).
Id. at 2522.
Scholars presenting this account include Bagenstos, supra note 217, at 1132, Primus, supra note
217, at 1376-77, and, most prominently, George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1311 (1987) (“The theory of disparate
impact only addresses the difficulty of proving pretextual discrimination . . . .”).
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. The Inclusive Communities Court, though, paired this statement with a sophisticated view of discriminatory intent as “unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classiﬁcation as disparate treatment.” Id.
See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 10-24
(2014); Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1470-74 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle].
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beneﬁts accrue not just to minorities but also to nonminorities who previously
were unable to comply with the criterion as well.225
I ﬁnd some of these accounts more compelling than others. The point I want
to make here, though, is that all of them extend to voting just as easily as to
employment or housing. They thus provide no reason, as a matter of disparate
impact theory, to differentiate between voting and the ﬁelds where the usual
framework already governs. Consider the anti-racial-stratiﬁcation model. Inequality in the workplace is reduced when a hiring practice that disproportionately and unnecessarily excludes minority applicants is struck down. So is residential segregation when a court invalidates a housing policy that unjustiﬁably
prevents a larger fraction of minority members from settling in a given neighborhood. And so too is unequal political participation when the measure being
nulliﬁed is a voting requirement that unreasonably burdens the franchise for a
greater share of minority citizens.
Or take the view of disparate impact law as an “evidentiary dragnet” for purposeful racial discrimination.226 The logic that allows an invidious aim to be inferred is identical whether the practice at issue pertains to employment, housing,
or voting. In each context, one may surmise that a defendant intends to disadvantage minority members when she adopts a policy that causes a substantial
and unwarranted racial disparity. This sort of disparity in the electoral process
seems no more or less suspicious than anywhere else.
The claim holds for Fishkin’s bottleneck theory too. A bottleneck, again, is
any criterion that restricts access to a good. It can therefore be a hiring test that
job applicants must pass to earn employment, a condition for selling a house that
homebuyers must satisfy to complete the purchase, or a voting requirement with
which citizens must comply to cast a ballot. In each case, there is a pool of people
who want something and a practice that permits some but not all of them to get
it. In each case, moreover, if the bottleneck were removed, “the beneﬁts of the
policy change [would be] universal.”227 Minority and nonminority job applicants, homebuyers, and citizens alike would be able to enjoy opportunities that
had previously been denied to them.228
225.

See Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498 (“The changes made to
loosen the bottleneck apply to everyone, not only to members of the statutorily protected
group.”).
226. The phrase belongs to Richard Primus. See Primus, supra note 217, at 1376-77.
227. Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498.
228. If anything, a voting bottleneck may be more problematic than an employment or housing
bottleneck because it is harder to circumvent. Someone denied a job can apply to another
employer; someone denied an apartment can ﬁnd another landlord; but someone denied the
franchise cannot vote without moving to another jurisdiction (if even then).
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3. Nature of the Activity
The ﬁnal factor bearing on the usual framework’s applicability is the nature
of voting. Voting plainly differs from employment and housing in certain key
respects. It is exclusively regulated by the state; indeed, it cannot even occur unless the government ﬁrst establishes and administers an electoral system.229 In
contrast, private actors make most decisions about the workplace and real estate,
based on their own considerations rather than those of any higher authority. Voting is also not a market good; it has no price set by the forces of supply and
demand. On the other hand, market dynamics largely determine the wages of
employees and the costs of houses.230 And voting is not a rival good either; when
I cast a ballot, I do not stop you from doing the same. Conversely, when a job is
ﬁlled or a home is sold, the position or the property becomes unavailable to everybody else.231

229.

See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 51 (2004) (“[E]lections and related democratic
processes are pervasively regulated . . . .”).
230. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1141
(1989) (distinguishing between “political, criminal, and educational rights” and “‘ordinary’
social and economic goods, like jobs and housing”).
231. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 304 (1971)
(observing that “enfranchising an illiterate . . . [does not] deprive the literate of the vote,”
while “the job that goes to one cannot go to the other”).
Another difference between voting and all other goods (including employment and
housing) is that it is arguably antecedent to them. Voting, that is, helps to allocate political
power, and thus to set the terms on which all other goods are granted (at least to the extent
the state is involved in the goods’ provision). As the Supreme Court put it more than a century
ago, the franchise is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.” Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). This point is true enough, but it does not counsel
against the usual framework’s adoption in the section 2 context. Voting may be conceptually
upstream from all other goods, but it is not more important than them, nor are a jurisdiction’s
justiﬁcations for limiting the franchise rendered irrelevant by its antecedent status.
A further contrast between voting and other areas is that defendants may have more of
an incentive to discriminate racially with respect to voting. Racial discrimination in, say, the
employment context is often irrational because it prevents employers from hiring the best
possible employees (who may, of course, be minorities). In the voting domain, though, racial
discrimination is frequently highly beneﬁcial to politicians because of the severe racial polarization of American politics. By burdening the votes of minority citizens, in particular, politicians unlikely to receive those votes can improve their odds of staying in office. This point,
too, is accurate but orthogonal to the issue of whether the usual framework should be implemented under section 2. If discriminatory intent is more prevalent with respect to voting, then
liability is simply more likely to be found under both the Constitution and whatever test is
used in statutory vote denial cases.
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Signiﬁcant as these distinctions are, they do not render the usual framework
any less apt for voting. Instead, they either are legally irrelevant or suggest that
courts should have fewer qualms about striking down electoral (versus employment or housing) practices. Start with the fact that the defendant in section 2
vote denial cases is necessarily the government. This does not actually distinguish these cases from Title VII and FHA suits, which can be brought against
public employers and housing providers as readily as against private ones. Additionally, the governmental status of section 2 defendants simply means that
public rather than private interests must be analyzed under the usual framework’s second and third prongs. Public interests like preventing fraud, conserving resources, and efficiently administering elections are different from the private pursuit of proﬁt. But they are no less amenable to being weighed for their
importance, scrutinized for their ﬁt with challenged policies, and having this ﬁt
compared to that of alternative measures.232
Similarly, the main implication of voting not being a market good is that
there is no market-based reason to limit it. The restriction of the franchise, that
is, cannot be justiﬁed by what Griggs called “business necessity”233 or Inclusive
Communities described as “the practical business choices and proﬁt-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”234 The most
familiar (and perhaps the most powerful) rationale for permitting racial disparities is thus off the table when it comes to disputed electoral practices. To defend
such disparities, jurisdictions must resort to less common (and maybe less compelling) interests than proﬁt maximization.
As for voting’s lack of scarcity, it too cuts in favor of liability in section 2 cases.
When a good (like employment or housing) is in short supply, courts may be
concerned about the innocent victims of their decisions: the nonminority job
applicants who would no longer get offers if a hiring criterion were dropped, the
nonminority homebuyers who would no longer be sold units if a housing policy
were revised, and so on.235 These worries may convince courts not to strike down

232.

Recognizing the equivalence of public and private interests under the usual framework, HUD
simply substituted the phrase “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” for Title
VII’s “business necessity” when it promulgated its disparate impact rule. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11470. HUD noted approvingly that the former term “applies to individuals, businesses, nonproﬁt organizations, and public entities.” Id. (emphasis added); see also
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522
(2015) (citing this HUD analysis and referring interchangeably to “housing authorities and
private developers” as FHA defendants).
233. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
234. 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
235. For a good discussion of such “visible victims,” see Primus, supra note 217, at 1369-75.
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challenged practices, or at least to dilute the remedies they ultimately impose.
But with a nonrivalrous good like voting, there is no risk of such collateral damage. A ruling that makes it easier for minority citizens to vote does not impede
nonminority citizens from casting ballots. In fact, it helps them to vote, thus
yielding innocent beneﬁciaries rather than victims—a dynamic that could plausibly induce courts to err on the side of liability in section 2 litigation.236
C. Answered Questions
Several different modes of analysis, then, lead to the same conclusion: that
the usual framework is applicable to section 2 vote denial claims. The VRA’s legislative history, like those of Title VII and the FHA, expresses concern about unjustiﬁed, but not all, racial disparities. The theoretical accounts of disparate impact law make as much sense for voting as for employment and housing. And
while voting (unlike employment and housing) is a nonmarket, nonrivalrous
good regulated solely by the state, these features simply make the usual framework more likely to result in proplaintiff rulings in electoral cases.237
Not only is the usual framework applicable to section 2 vote denial claims; it
also should, in fact, be applied to them. One reason why, to which I now turn, is
that in the decades in which the usual framework has been used under Title VII
and the FHA, courts, legislatures, and agencies have arrived at answers—reasonable answers—to the questions that have divided judges under section 2. If the
usual framework were extended to section 2, these doctrinal solutions would

236.

See id. at 1381 (noting that VRA remedies generally do not create visible victims); see also Paul
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Nondiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1976) (“The voting test suspension remedies have been relatively uncontroversial because they do not frustrate the legitimate expectations of third parties or prefer the intended beneﬁciaries to others similarly situated . . . .”).
237. This is a good place to note that, in my view, the usual framework is inapplicable to section 2
vote dilution claims. First, the Supreme Court has already speciﬁed a different approach for
vote dilution claims. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Second, section 2’s legislative history identiﬁes a series of factors, most importantly racial polarization in voting, that
must be considered in vote dilution cases but that are foreign to the usual framework. See S.
REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-30 (1982). And third, conceptually, vote dilution is concerned above all
with the legislative representation of racially deﬁned groups. See Stephanopoulos, supra note
28, at 1361-93. This focus on group representation sharply distinguishes section 2 vote dilution
claims from the usual framework, in which election outcomes play no role and the overriding
goal is to avoid unjustiﬁed racial disparities in political participation. The focus on group representation also explains why vote dilution law emphasizes issues like racial polarization and
geographic compactness that appear nowhere in the usual framework. These issues have no
bearing on whether a disparate impact exists or is justiﬁed—but they have everything to do
with whether a minority group is adequately legislatively represented.
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presumably come with it. They would thereby settle disputes that show no sign
of fading on their own and lend coherence to a body of law whose current hallmark is disagreement over matters large and small.238
1. Speciﬁc Practice or Entire System?
The ﬁrst unanswered question about section 2 vote denial claims is whether
they should be brought against speciﬁc electoral practices or systems of election
administration in their entirety.239 In the Title VII context, Congress opted in
most circumstances for particularity in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Echoing a
pair of earlier Supreme Court decisions,240 Congress required “the complaining
party [to] demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact.”241 The only exception arises “if the complaining party
can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis.”242 HUD took the same position when it clariﬁed the operation of the usual framework in FHA cases. In general, a plaintiff must “identif[y] the speciﬁc practice that caused the alleged discriminatory effect.”243 On occasion, though, “it may be appropriate to challenge
the decision-making process as a whole.”244
The point of this particularity requirement is to focus litigation—to prevent
it from sprawling into all of a defendant’s policies and all of the effects they might
have, individually or in unison.245 The requirement is also advantageous to defendants, on balance. It forces plaintiffs either to isolate the measures that, in
their view, cause racial disparities or to convince courts that no such isolation is

238.

For a detailed discussion of this doctrinal discord, see supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.1.
240. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“[A] plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is the application of a speciﬁc or particular employment practice that has
created the disparate impact under attack.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“The plaintiff must begin by identifying the speciﬁc
employment practice that is challenged.”).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2018).
242. Id.
243. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11469.
244. Id.
245. See generally Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 459-60
(1998) (discussing in detail the particularity requirement).
239.
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possible. As a result, defendants may avoid liability when plaintiffs cannot pinpoint the responsible practices or, even if found liable, defendants may be compelled to change only small parts of their decision-making processes. These
prodefendant elements may explain why the Supreme Court ﬁrst endorsed particularity in the late 1980s, during its period of greatest hostility toward Title VII
disparate impact claims.246
In section 2 vote denial cases, particularity would typically oblige plaintiffs
to establish separately the racial disparity attributable to each challenged electoral policy. Except in unusual circumstances, plaintiffs would not be able to
point to an overall difference in political participation by race and then to ascribe
it to the totality of a jurisdiction’s voting practices. Also precluded would be judicial analyses that “consider the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect
on minority access to the ballot box,” in the Fourth Circuit’s words,247 or that
“look not at [a measure] in isolation but to the entire voting and registration
system,” as the Seventh Circuit put it.248 Court decisions of this kind plainly aggregate electoral policies instead of disentangling them and then assessing them
one by one.
2. Does the Size of the Disparity Matter?
The second question that has perplexed courts in section 2 vote denial cases
is whether any racial disparity is actionable or only one that reaches a certain
size.249 As early as Albemarle, the Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, only
employment practices that have “signiﬁcantly different” effects on minorities and
nonminorities establish a prima facie case.250 Consistent with this ruling, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published guidelines in
1978 stating that “[a] selection rate for any race . . . which is less than four-ﬁfths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact.”251 The guidelines added
246.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (adopting “this speciﬁc
causation requirement” despite the counterargument that it is “unduly burdensome on Title
VII plaintiffs”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014).
See supra Section I.C.2.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (requiring “a signiﬁcantly discriminatory impact”).
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018).

1611

the yale law journal

128:1566

2019

that “[s]maller differences in selection rate” may also suffice if “they are signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical terms.”252 Since their issuance, courts have
often cited the guidelines but have not followed them slavishly. As the Supreme
Court has observed, the guidelines have functioned as “a rule of thumb.”253
The reason to require a signiﬁcant (not just any) racial disparity is to direct
enforcement efforts toward the more meaningful disparate impacts in American
society.254 Disparate impacts are ubiquitous, alas, so if they were all actionable,
many institutions might be paralyzed by litigation and more severe discrepancies
could be overshadowed by relatively trivial ones.255 Additionally, as several
scholars have pointed out, the four-ﬁfths rule cannot be used in all circumstances. When minority and nonminority selection rates are low, in particular,
the difference between them is more informative than their ratio.256 The fourﬁfths rule can also be misleading when the sample size is small because the observed ratio is then the result of a limited number of observations.257 Due to
these drawbacks, academics have urged258—and courts have mostly agreed259—
252.
253.

254.

255.

256.

257.
258.

259.

Id.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 995-96 n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion)). In the FHA context, interestingly, HUD
declined to “codify a signiﬁcance requirement” due to “the numerous and varied practices and
wide variety of private and governmental entities covered by the Act.” FHA Implementation,
supra note 172, at 11468. For a recent article that does address the issue of signiﬁcance in FHA
cases, see Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing
Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 685, 697-710 (2016).
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND.
L.J. 773, 791 (2009) (describing this requirement as “well-suited for aiding courts in determining whether a disparity is sufficiently large to matter—that is, whether it has practical
signiﬁcance”).
See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 696 (2011) (“Adverse impact is everywhere, and the world is full of disparate impact lawsuits waiting to happen.”).
See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 154
(1980); Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 810 (1978); Wax, supra note 255, at 629.
See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 256, at 88-90; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 50;
Shoben, supra note 256, at 809.
See sources cited supra notes 256-257; see also RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN,
THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 5:7, at 5-19 (1994) (“Plaintiffs should have the option,
however, of demonstrating adverse impact by statistical signiﬁcance instead of the four-ﬁfths
rule.”); Peresie, supra note 254, at 776 (arguing that these two approaches “fulﬁll complementary roles and thus should [not] be viewed . . . as alternatives”).
See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(describing how courts have used both the four-ﬁfths rule and “the ‘standard deviation’ analysis”).
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that the four-ﬁfths rule should be supplemented by scrutiny of whether the difference in selection rates is statistically signiﬁcant.
Applying these methods to section 2 vote denial claims, small, statistically
insigniﬁcant disparities would not give rise to liability. Normatively, the Fourth
Circuit might be right that “even one disenfranchised voter . . . is too many,”260
but legally it would be wrong. At a more granular level, the methods would operate as follows: First, the selection rates for otherwise qualiﬁed minority and
nonminority citizens would be determined—that is, the rates at which they are
able to comply with a given requirement for voting. (Survey evidence could be
used to calculate these rates, as could a jurisdiction’s own electoral records.)
Next, the lower of the rates would be divided by the higher, and the statistical
signiﬁcance of the difference between the rates would be computed. A prima facie case would most clearly be established when the rates’ ratio is below fourﬁfths and the rates’ difference is statistically signiﬁcant. Conversely, a plaintiff’s
claim would be weaker if the four-ﬁfths rule was not satisﬁed or statistical signiﬁcance was not shown.
3. Ability to Comply or Effect on Turnout?
Third, which selection rates, exactly, should be considered in this analysis:
minority and nonminority citizens’ capacities for compliance with a provision,
or their eventual levels of voter turnout?261 In the 1982 case of Connecticut v.
Teal,262 the Supreme Court held that Title VII is concerned with the direct effects
of employment practices, not their downstream consequences. The Court faced
an employer whose written exam for promotion to supervisor had a disparate
racial impact but whose affirmative-action program ensured a proportionate
share of minority supervisors.263 The Court ruled that the “‘bottom line’” of proportionality “does not preclude [plaintiffs] from establishing a prima facie case,
nor does it provide [defendants] with a defense to such a case.”264 The Court
explained that a racial disparity at one stage of the promotion process, which
bars certain minority employees from becoming supervisors, cannot be offset by
racial balance after the process has concluded, which beneﬁts a different set of
minority employees. “Title VII does not permit the victim of a . . . discriminatory

260.

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
See supra Section I.C.3.
262. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
263. Id. at 443-44.
264. Id. at 442.
261.
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policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other persons of his or
her race . . . were hired.”265
In a section 2 vote denial suit, a particular electoral practice is the analogue
to the written exam that was disputed in Teal. And voter turnout by race is the
equivalent of the supervisors’ racial makeup: the “bottom line” that is the outcome of the entire electoral system in the former case, and the whole promotion
process in the latter. Under Teal, it is plain that voter turnout (like the makeup
of the supervisor pool) is legally irrelevant. Plaintiffs need not prove a racial disparity in turnout; defendants cannot escape liability by showing that minority
and nonminority citizens vote at similar rates—and the numerous lower courts
that have held to the contrary are incorrect.266 Under Teal, too, the disparate impact that does matter is the one directly caused by the electoral policy at issue.
Plaintiffs’ burden is simply to demonstrate that minority citizens have more difﬁculty abiding by the policy than do nonminority citizens.
4. Is Interaction with Discrimination Necessary?
Fourth, once plaintiffs have met this burden, must they also establish that
the reason for the policy’s disparate impact is its interaction with social and historical discrimination?267 In the 1977 case of Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme
Court addressed two hiring criteria for Alabama prison guards: a minimum
height of ﬁve feet two inches and a minimum weight of 120 pounds.268 In tandem, these criteria excluded far more women (forty-one percent ) than men (less
than one percent).269 But they did so not through any interaction with discriminatory conditions, but rather because women, as a biological matter, tend to be
shorter and lighter than men. The Court nevertheless found Alabama liable under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.270 The Court thus codiﬁed the principles that “the reason the [practice] has an adverse impact is [not] at issue” and
265.

Id. at 455; see also id. (“Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate
against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other
members of the employees’ group.”). The EEOC, however, states in its guidelines that if “the
total selection process does not have an adverse impact,” then federal agencies generally “will
not take enforcement action based upon adverse impact of any component of that process.”
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (2018); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 453 n.12 (discussing the EEOC’s position).
266. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Section I.C.4.
268. 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977).
269. Id. at 329-30.
270. Id. at 331.
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that “the mere fact of adverse impact requires the employer to justify its practice.”271
It is true, as noted earlier,272 that most racial disparities can be connected to
social and historical discrimination. Disparities like those in Dothard, attributable to biology rather than to prejudice, are quite unusual, especially if the relevant cleavage is race instead of gender.273 But it is also true that proving a policy’s
interaction with discriminatory conditions can be difficult, requiring discovery
and expert testimony about a host of issues extraneous to the challenged measure. Dothard’s approach therefore saves plaintiffs the time and cost of documenting discrimination and its implications—even though, typically, they could do so
if they had to (and if money were no object).274
Dothard may be the Supreme Court decision most inconsistent with the
lower courts’ two-part test for section 2 vote denial claims. The test’s second
prong (and conceptual centerpiece) is the linkage of a racial discrepancy to a
practice’s interaction with social and historical discrimination.275 This is the
prong to which the Senate factors are relevant, and on which courts spend much
of their analytical energy.276 Yet Dothard holds that all of this judicial exertion is
unnecessary. Why a policy causes a disparate impact is immaterial; the disparity
alone is enough to establish a prima facie case (so long as it is substantial and
the direct result of a speciﬁc measure).277 Accordingly, Dothard has the potential
to transform section 2 vote denial litigation. It would negate one of the elements
of the lower courts’ test, and along with that prong, the Senate factors that have
been used to analyze it. These doctrinal features do not exist under Title VII, and

271.

272.
273.

274.

275.
276.
277.

Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed
Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 963; see also, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 959 (2005) (“Dothard
is signiﬁcant because it cut disparate impact free from any necessity that the disparity’s cause
be traced either to de jure or more general societal discrimination . . . .”).
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
Indeed, in the vote denial context, it is hard to think of any racial disparities that could be tied
to biology. What possible electoral policy could disproportionately affect minority citizens because of biological differences between them and nonminority citizens?
See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357,
1402-03 (2017) (arguing that if interaction with social and historical discrimination had to be
proven, “an evidentiary quagmire would arise from trying to sort out which mechanisms generated the disparities”).
See supra Section I.A.
See id.
See supra Sections II.C.1-.3 (discussing the particularity, substantiality, and directness requirements).
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if disparate impact law were uniﬁed, they would not remain under section 2 either.
5. Are Minority Preferences a Defense?
Fifth, even if plaintiffs need not identify the reason for a practice’s disparate
impact, can defendants avoid liability by showing that minorities’ subjective preferences are the explanation?278 Dothard suggests the answer is no. Alabama argued that women were underrepresented in its workforce because few of them
were “seriously interested in applying[] for prison guard positions.”279 The
Court rejected this defense because applicant interest can be shaped by the very
criterion at issue. “A potential applicant could easily determine her height and
weight and conclude that to make an application would be futile.”280 In a portion
of Wards Cove that is still good law, the Court elaborated that the “proper comparison” under Title VII is “between the racial composition of the qualiﬁed persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs.”281 The qualiﬁed
persons in the labor market, of course, are not those who are interested in a position or who have actually applied for it but, rather, the individuals with the requisite skills and experience to do the job effectively. The qualiﬁed persons’ subjective preferences, in other words, are beside the point.282
If the lack-of-interest defense were unavailable in section 2 vote denial cases,
then jurisdictions could not claim that minorities are more affected by a policy
because they prefer to participate electorally in ways targeted by the policy. With
respect to a voter-purge law, contra the Third Circuit, it would be irrelevant that

278.

See supra Section I.C.5.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 330 (majority opinion); see also id. (“[O]therwise qualiﬁed people might be discouraged
from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as
being discriminatory.”).
281. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (quoting Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
282. In the leading article on the lack-of-interest defense, Vicki Schultz agrees that “[i]f the disparate impact model is to have any meaning,” the defense cannot apply to it. Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace
in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1762 n.44
(1990); cf. Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination Law,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515, 534 (2007) (noting that “no court has ever based its decision on
the ‘failure to train’ rationale,” a defense that is similar to lack of interest).

279.

1616

disparate impact, unified law

minorities are removed from the rolls at higher rates because they more frequently “choose” not to vote or register.283 With respect to a ban on same-day
voter registration, likewise, its disparate impact could not be excused on the
ground that minorities “preferred to use [same-day registration] over [other registration] methods.”284 These are classic arguments about minorities’ inclinations, which would have no place in the doctrine.
6. How Does Tenuousness Work?
Sixth, turning from barred defenses to ones that are very much available,
what kinds of justiﬁcations, tied in which ways to disputed measures, may jurisdictions offer for the measures’ disparate impacts?285 HUD discussed these issues in detail in its statement about the usual framework’s operation in FHA
cases. “[A]ny interest justifying a practice with a discriminatory effect,” the
agency announced, must be “substantial, legitimate, [and] nondiscriminatory.”286 “A ‘substantial’ interest is a core interest of the organization that has a
direct relationship to the function of that organization.”287 A legitimate interest
is one that is “genuine and not false.”288 And a nondiscriminatory interest “does
not itself discriminate based on a protected characteristic.”289 Moreover, the defendant must prove not only the existence of a substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory interest, but also “the necessity of the challenged practice to
achieve that interest.”290 This necessity requirement, according to HUD, “best
effectuates the broad, remedial goal of the [FHA]” and is “comparable to the
protections afforded under Title VII.”291

283.

Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 315 (3d
Cir. 1994).
284. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 351 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224 (4th Cir. 2014).
285. See supra Section I.C.6.
286. FHA Implementation, supra note 172, at 11470.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 11471 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 11471-72. In Inclusive Communities, the Court agreed with HUD’s formulation, holding
that “housing authorities and private developers [must] be allowed to maintain a policy if
they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (emphasis added).
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These Title VII protections have not been articulated as clearly as their FHA
counterparts292 but are materially equivalent. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
“job related[ness]” and “business necessity” are the rationales an employer may
assert for an employment practice’s disparate impact.293 These rationales, the
Act’s accompanying Senate report adds, are synonymous with “effective job performance.”294 The report further states that “the employer must prove that the
practice . . . [is] essential to effective job performance,” meaning that “the relationship between the practice and effective job performance must be a close
one.”295 The gold standard for establishing this relationship, per the EEOC’s
guidelines, is a formal validation study “consist[ing] of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or signiﬁcantly correlated
with important elements of job performance.”296 However, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that while validation studies may be advisable, “employers
are not required” to use them to “show[] that particular criteria predict actual
on-the-job performance.”297
This justiﬁcation defense is a vital component of the usual framework. Without it, the framework would imperil all measures that cause disparate impacts,
thus ﬂouting Congress’s intent that liability be limited to unwarranted racial disparities.298 If the defense were recognized in section 2 vote denial cases, the Senate factor asking “whether the policy underlying the [electoral practice] is tenuous”299 would rise dramatically in importance. This, after all, is the only factor
relating to the strength of a jurisdiction’s rationale for a voting requirement.
Tenuousness, then, would no longer be an afterthought for courts, as it (mostly)
292.

See, e.g., Wax, supra note 255, at 633 (complaining that “courts vary widely in the standards
they apply and retain broad discretion in deciding what kind of evidence satisﬁes the business
necessity defense”).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). Even though they are conceptually distinct, job relatedness and business necessity are not often analyzed separately in Title VII cases. Griggs,
notably, referred to them interchangeably. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32
(1971).
294. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 41 (1990).
295. Id. at 42; see also id. (further explaining that “use of the disputed practice [must] produce[]
workers who effectively perform important aspects of the job”).
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2018). The EEOC’s guidelines go into great detail specifying technical
standards for validation studies. See id. § 1607.14; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975) (approvingly citing these standards).
297. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976) (“[T]here is no single method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to job performance.”).
298. See supra Section II.B.1.
299. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982).

1618

disparate impact, unified law

is today.300 Instead, it would be a distinct element of the cause of action—a consideration that would have to be addressed whenever it was raised by a jurisdiction.
But while the tenuousness factor bears some resemblance to the justiﬁcation
defense, its actual wording leaves room for improvement. For one thing, the factor does not specify which party bears the burden of proving tenuousness (or
the lack thereof). Under the defense, this burden is squarely on the jurisdiction
maintaining the voting requirement. For another, it is somewhat awkward to
speak of proving the lack of tenuousness. It would be better to say (as the defense
does) that the jurisdiction must show that its electoral practice is justiﬁed. And
tenuousness pertains to the substantiality of a jurisdiction’s interest but not to
how well this interest is advanced by a given policy. Again, a preferable formulation would encompass both an interest’s weight and a measure’s ﬁt with it.
Accordingly, the tenuousness factor should not simply be lifted from the Senate
report into the legal test for section 2 vote denial claims. Rather, it should ﬁrst
be amended so that it mirrors the justiﬁcation defense under Title VII and the
FHA.
7. What Is the Remedy?
Lastly, once a court ﬁnds a jurisdiction liable, what relief should the court
order?301 Under Title VII, “the usual remedy in a disparate impact case” is “general invalidation of the challenged policy.”302 The court simply nulliﬁes the unlawful employment practice; it does not try to reduce the practice’s racial disparities or to make it more “consistent with business necessity.”303 Under the FHA,
similarly, the Supreme Court held in Inclusive Communities that “[r]emedial orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice.”304 But in both employment and housing doctrine there is precedent for more aggressive relief: in particular, the adoption of race-conscious
measures that aim to reverse the effects of the defendant’s discrimination. In the
1986 case of Local 28 v. EEOC, a plurality of the Court held that “affirmative race-

300.

See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.C.7.
302. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 680 (2001); see
also Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle, supra note 224, at 1498 (noting that “on the remedy
side, [disparate impact] law is universal and race-neutral”).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
304. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512
(2015).
301.
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conscious relief . . . may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union has
engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.”305 The Inclusive Communities Court likewise cautioned that “[r]emedial orders that impose racial targets
or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions,” but did not categorically bar such approaches.306
Extending these remedial principles to section 2 vote denial claims, courts
should generally strike down electoral practices that they deem illegal. They
should not try—as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have attempted307—to relax
burdensome policies while still leaving them in place. Under Title VII and the
FHA, this kind of remedial creativity is for defendants, not courts. Under those
provisions, though, a different sort of remedial resourcefulness is judicially permissible. In extreme cases involving large and longstanding disparate impacts,
courts may consider race-conscious relief like targeted outreach to minority citizens and poll-worker training to accommodate minority voters.308 Still more
racially explicit measures are conceivable, too, but should probably be avoided
lest they raise the “difficult constitutional questions” ﬂagged by Inclusive Communities.309 Under current law, less drastic steps like outreach and training are
on ﬁrmer ground than remedies that racially differentiate with respect to voting
itself.310
***
If disparate impact law were uniﬁed, then, section 2 vote denial cases would
follow the same rules as Title VII and FHA proceedings. (1) Plaintiffs would
challenge particular electoral practices, not whole systems of election administration. (2) Substantial (but not all) racial disparities in citizens’ access to the franchise would be actionable. (3) Disparities caused directly by disputed practices
305.

478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Eric Schnapper, The Varieties of Numerical Remedies, 39 STAN. L. REV. 851, 852 (1987) (noting that “courts quickly arrived at a
consensus in favor of permitting [race-conscious] remedies”).
306. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
307. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
308. For a rare example of such measures being ordered in a section 2 vote denial case, see United
States v. Berks County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583-85 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
309. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
310. See id. at 2525 (conceding that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper
fashion” when crafting remedies). A racial quota is the quintessential example of a more aggressive race-conscious remedy. In the electoral context, the judicial imposition of a quota is
almost unthinkable. It is very hard to imagine a court barring nonminority citizens from voting, or otherwise burdening their exercise of the franchise, in order to eliminate a racial disparity.
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would be relevant, while ultimate voter turnout would not be. (4) Disparities
would not have to be linked to practices’ interaction with social and historical
discrimination. (5) Nor would it matter if disparities stem from minorities’ subjective preferences. (6) If a prima facie case were established, a jurisdiction could
try to show (with empirical evidence) that its electoral policy is necessary to
achieve a valid interest.311 And (7) if liability were imposed, invalidation of the
offending measure would typically be the remedy.
To be clear, I do not claim that all of these doctrinal parameters are optimal.
Rather, my argument is that they are reasonable—consistent with the goals of
disparate impact law and plausibly balancing plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests—and, equally importantly, that they are settled under Title VII and the FHA.
The uniﬁcation of disparate impact law would thus answer many of the lingering
questions about section 2 vote denial claims and answer them in defensible ways.
It would provide the beneﬁt of doctrinal coherence without exacting a serious
substantive cost.312
D. Resolved Concerns
There is one more reason to extend the usual framework to section 2 vote
denial claims. It is to dispel the constitutional cloud that hangs over the two-part
test that courts have applied thus far to these suits.313 Compared to this test, the
usual framework would ﬁnd liability less often because it would arm jurisdictions with a potent new defense: that their electoral practices are necessary to
further their substantial interests. By limiting fault in this way, the usual framework would improve section 2’s congruence and proportionality with the Reconstruction Amendments. Discriminatory intent must be shown to prove a violation under these provisions, and it can often be inferred when a voting
311.

And if this showing were made, the plaintiff could try to prove that the jurisdiction’s interest
could be comparably advanced by some other policy that produces a smaller racial disparity.
See supra Section II.A. I did not discuss this aspect of the usual framework in this Section
because courts in section 2 vote denial cases have not disagreed with respect to it. See supra
Section I.C.
312. For good discussions of the value of doctrinal unity, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-40
(1994); and Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States’
Experience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1088-92 (1986). Doctrinal unity, moreover, is just one of
the reasons to abide by the usual framework’s answers to the questions that persist about vote
denial law. The others are (1) the reasonableness of these answers; (2) the answers’ consistency with the history and theory of disparate impact law, see supra Section II.B; and (3)
the fact that some of the answers may be constitutionally compelled, see infra Section II.D.
313. For a discussion of this constitutional uncertainty, see supra Section I.D.
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requirement unjustiﬁably causes a racial disparity. The usual framework would
also ease the tension between section 2 and the colorblindness principle that, according to the current Supreme Court, animates the Equal Protection Clause.
Jurisdictions would not have to consider race to the same extent because they
could be conﬁdent that, if their electoral policies are warranted, the measures
would not be at risk.
As a logical matter, the argument that the usual framework restricts liability
relative to the courts’ two-part test is ironclad.314 In most circumstances, the
two-part test boils down to a single inquiry: whether an electoral practice produces a disparate impact.315 In contrast, the usual framework never stops with
proof of a racial disparity; it always gives a jurisdiction an opportunity to justify
the discrepancy. Whenever a justiﬁcation is successfully presented (and the
plaintiff cannot identify a comparably effective but less discriminatory alternative), liability does not arise under the usual framework even though it does under the two-part test. The framework’s reach is thus a subset of the test’s. Some
policies are unlawful under the test but not the framework, while no measures
are proscribed by the framework but not the test.
Empirical studies of Title VII, the FHA, and Title VI conﬁrm this reasoning.
They demonstrate that, far from being toothless, the usual framework’s justiﬁcation defense frequently accounts for plaintiffs’ defeats in disparate impact
cases. With respect to Title VII, Michael Selmi surveyed about three hundred
decisions from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.316 He found that plaintiffs prevailed
in only twenty to twenty-ﬁve percent of these disputes,317 and that “the business
necessity prong . . . always proved [a] greater hurdle” than establishing a racial
disparity.318 In challenges to hiring tests, in particular, “[a]s employers began to
validate their examinations”—that is, to show they are related to effective job
performance—outcomes “migrated from successful plaintiff cases to successful
defendant cases.”319
With respect to the FHA, similarly, Stacy Seicshnaydre analyzed all ninetytwo appellate decisions involving disparate impact claims between 1971 and

314.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

At least, the argument is ironclad if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case are
held constant. As explained above, there remains considerable doubt about these elements
under existing section 2 doctrine. See supra Sections I.C.1-.5, II.C.1-.5.
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
See Selmi, supra note 14, at 734-35.
See id. at 738-39.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 742.
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2013.320 Again, plaintiffs’ win rate was just 20%321 and defendants had an “easier
time” justifying their policies, especially when the measures sought to improve
housing rather than to limit access to it.322 As to Title VI too, Charles Abernathy
examined all sixteen appellate decisions in which disparate impact theories were
raised.323 Once more, plaintiffs were victorious less than 15% of the time,324 and
it was the “balancing defense . . . that eventually undermined Title VI in the
lower appellate courts.”325 “The interests asserted by grantees . . . [were] by any
measure substantial,” and “judges [could not] say that these [were] less important than the ﬁght against residual effects of racial distinctiveness.”326
These experiences with the usual framework suggest that if it were extended
to section 2 vote denial claims, plaintiffs would often lose their suits.327 Moreover, a key reason they would often lose would be the usual framework’s justiﬁcation defense. Jurisdictions would assert interests allegedly served by their electoral practices, and courts would hold that the interests are substantial and that
the practices are necessary to achieve them. To be sure, many Title VII and FHA
decisions may be of limited relevance here because the interests they evaluate are
job relatedness and business necessity. These market-based concerns have no
equivalent in the nonmarket domain of voting.328 But some Title VII and FHA
cases, and all Title VI disputes, feature governmental defendants invoking public
rationales for their policies. These scenarios are analogous to the section 2 vote
denial context, and so are probative of how the usual framework would operate
in this new area.329
Why would section 2 be less constitutionally vulnerable, though, if it were
harder to satisfy? The explanations are straightforward. Start with Congress’s
320.
321.
322.
323.

324.
325.
326.
327.

328.
329.

See Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 391-92.
See id. at 393, 399 ﬁg.6.
Id. at 413-14.
See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312. All of these decisions were announced prior to Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that no private right of action exists to enforce
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI.
See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312 (noting just two decisions in plaintiffs’ favor).
Id. at 286.
Id. at 313-14.
In fact, section 2 plaintiffs already lose most of their suits. See Cox & Miles, supra note 28, at
13-14 (observing that “decisions in our dataset assigned section 2 liability about 30% of the
time” and that “the rate at which courts found section 2 liability exceeded 40% during 19821989 . . . , but it fell to 26% during the 1990s”).
See supra Section II.B.3.
I do not consider here how the usual framework would apply to particular electoral practices.
For analyses along these lines, see infra Part IV.

1623

the yale law journal

128:1566

2019

authority to enact the provision, which depends on the “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end.”330 The harm to be avoided or cured by the Reconstruction Amendments is intentional racial discrimination.331 Such discrimination can seldom be
deduced from a racial disparity alone. As the Supreme Court has explained, a
“disproportionate impact” has “limited probative value” by itself, and “cases are
rare” in which it means that an “invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.”332 Conversely, when a racial discrepancy cannot be justiﬁed by a
valid interest, it becomes easier to conclude that an illicit aim is afoot. Per Inclusive Communities, a needless discrepancy helps to “uncover[] discriminatory intent” and so “permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus.”333
If disparate impact law were uniﬁed, then, section 2 would prohibit only electoral practices that are, or plausibly might be, driven by racial bias. Section 2,
that is, would bar only governmental activity that unjustiﬁably causes a racial
disparity—and that thus supports a ﬁnding of a discriminatory purpose. This
narrower scope, in turn, would enhance section 2’s congruence and proportionality with the Reconstruction Amendments. These Amendments are offended
only by intentional racial discrimination, and that is all that section 2 would target: voting requirements that are actually invidious or from which an invidious
objective can reasonably be inferred. Section 2 would no longer reach the broader
swath of governmental conduct, involving disparate impact alone, that does not
permit this inference to be drawn.334
Turning to the potential clash between section 2 and the equal protection
principle of colorblindness, Inclusive Communities is again instructive. In it, the
Court warned that “serious constitutional questions” would arise if disparate
impact liability “were imposed solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.”335
These concerns would be allayed, though, if the legal standard were “properly
limited in key respects.”336 One such restriction is that “a disparate-impact claim

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
At least according to the current Supreme Court. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 & n.15 (1977).
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511-12
(2015).
See Primus, supra note 217, at 1377 (concurring that “disparate impact doctrine is more likely
to be” upheld if it is aimed at “[p]reventing intentional discrimination”).
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
Id.
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that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.”337 Another “important and
appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited
is to give [defendants] leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by
their policies.”338
Based on these passages, section 2 would avoid excessive race consciousness
if it employed the usual framework in vote denial cases. As required by the Court,
a plaintiff would have to identify a particular electoral practice that produces a
disparate impact in order to establish a prima facie case.339 Also consistent with
the Court’s admonitions, a jurisdiction would be able to defend itself by showing
that its practice is “necessary to achieve a valid interest.”340 Thanks to these “adequate safeguards,” section 2 would not “cause race to be used and considered in
a pervasive way” or “‘almost inexorably lead’ [jurisdictions] to use ‘numerical
quotas.’”341 Section 2 would have these consequences only if it were violated by
a naked racial disparity. It would not unduly racialize the electoral process if,
instead, it banned unjustiﬁed discrepancies linked to speciﬁc voting requirements.342
iii. objections and responses
This concludes the affirmative case for unifying disparate impact law: the
usual framework (1) is applicable to section 2 vote denial claims, and it should
be applied to them in order (2) to resolve doctrinal disputes and (3) to bolster
section 2’s constitutionality. Next, I consider a number of legal and practical objections to this thesis. One counterargument is that section 2’s text and precedent
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 2523; see also id. (requiring a “robust causality requirement”).
Id. at 2522; see also id. (adding that “[t]his step of the analysis . . . provides a defense against
disparate-impact liability”).
See supra Section II.C.1.
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523; see supra Section II.C.6.
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
653 (1989)).
See Bagenstos, supra note 217, at 1129 (agreeing that if the usual framework is used, then “any
frontal constitutional assault on disparate-impact liability should fail”). Of course, this argument puts a great deal of weight on the 5-4 majority decision in Inclusive Communities, which
was written by Justice Kennedy, who no longer serves on the Court. But the main dissent in
Inclusive Communities did not question Justice Kennedy’s claim that the usual framework is
constitutional; it merely disagreed that the FHA recognizes disparate impact discrimination.
See 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting). Only Justice Thomas, in a solo dissent, contended
that “[d]isparate-impact liability” is “a rule without a reason, or at least without a legitimate
one,” and is thus constitutionally dubious. See id. at 2531 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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bar the usual framework’s extension to it. Another is that the usual framework
would simply repeat the analysis that is already conducted when an electoral policy is challenged on constitutional grounds. And a third is that the prior record
of the usual framework is so poor that every effort should be made not to expand
its domain any further. These concerns cannot be dismissed lightly. But neither
alone nor in tandem, in my view, do they lead to the conclusion that disparate
impact law should not be uniﬁed after all.
A. Text and Precedent
The ﬁrst objection is that standard legal sources do not support the usual
framework’s use for section 2 vote denial claims. Section 2’s own language mentions neither a justiﬁcation defense for jurisdictions nor an opportunity for
plaintiffs to rebut this defense by introducing a less discriminatory alternative.343
Nor does any Supreme Court decision about section 2 require these doctrinal
features. To the contrary, the Court’s preeminent section 2 case, Thornburg v.
Gingles, states that “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law . . . interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in
the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters.”344 Gingles adds that
the Senate factors are “probative of a § 2 violation”345 and “elaborate[] on the
nature of § 2 violations and on the proof required to establish these violations.”346 These comments are plainly more consistent with the courts’ two-part
test than with the usual framework. Indeed, they largely explain the test’s origins: lacking authoritative guidance for vote denial (as opposed to vote dilution)
claims, judges relied on the portions of Gingles that seemed generally applicable
to all section 2 theories.347
It is true, of course, that section 2’s language does not mandate the usual
framework’s use. If it did, there would be little point to an article that merely
echoed the textual command. But section 2 is equally silent regarding the courts’
two-part test. The need to show a practice’s interaction with social and historical
discrimination and the relevance of the Senate factors—these points are present
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018).
478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 43.
See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 377-79 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(citing and discussing Gingles); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (same); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240-41 (4th
Cir. 2014) (same); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 550-51, 554
(6th Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) (same).
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in Gingles, but they are nowhere to be found in section 2 itself. In fact, all the
provision says about vote denial claims is that they are cognizable because they
assert “a denial . . . of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or
color.”348 Section 2 is entirely mute as to which legal standard should govern
these claims. It is just as compatible with the usual framework as with the courts’
two-part test.349
Based on precedent, moreover, an agnostic statute is no obstacle to the usual
framework’s imposition. In Griggs, the Supreme Court famously unveiled the
framework without even specifying from which part of Title VII it stemmed.350
The Court’s reasoning was only slightly more textually bound in Smith v. City of
Jackson,351 the 2005 case that extended the usual framework to the ADEA. Because the ADEA’s language is very similar to that of Title VII, the Court held,
disparate impact claims must follow the same rules under both laws.352 The
Court reprised this logic in Inclusive Communities, explaining that the FHA’s text,
too, is “equivalent in function and purpose” to that of Title VII and the ADEA.353
Because the FHA “refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors,” it “must be construed to encompass” the usual framework.354
This line of argument is an even easier sell when it comes to section 2. Title
VII, the ADEA, and the FHA are ambiguous as to whether they can be breached
348.
349.

350.

351.
352.

353.
354.

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); see also supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing section 2’s
coverage of vote denial claims).
A more radical version of the textual argument is that section 2’s language is inconsistent with
both the courts’ two-part test and the usual framework, because it requires liability to be imposed based on a disparate impact alone. This claim also wrongly infers from section 2’s silence
about doctrinal elements beyond a disparate impact that these elements are precluded. The
claim, furthermore, cannot be reconciled with the Court’s approach to racial vote dilution in
Gingles and its progeny. This approach includes a host of factors (geographic compactness,
racial polarization, and so on) that are nowhere to be found in the statutory text. See generally
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections,
and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 404 (2012) (characterizing section 2 as a
“common law statute” that courts develop with little reference to the provision’s language).
The Court merely cited a pair of FHA subsections, without further comment, in its opinion’s
ﬁrst footnote. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971); see also Tex. Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015) (observing that in Griggs, “[t]he Court did not quote or cite the full statute”).
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
See id. at 233 (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes
having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to
have the same meaning in both statutes.”).
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518; see also id. at 2519 (noting “the structure common to all
three statutes” and “[t]his similarity in text and structure”).
Id. at 2518.

1627

the yale law journal

128:1566

2019

without a showing of discriminatory intent.355 In Griggs, City of Jackson, and Inclusive Communities, the Court therefore had to resolve this ambiguity ﬁrst; only
then could it rule that the usual framework would govern disparate impact
claims in these areas.356 In contrast, there is no doubt that section 2 can be infringed even in the absence of an invidious motive. The whole point of its 1982
revision was to make this clear,357 and the provision now explicitly bans electoral
practices that “result[] in” a race-based denial or abridgment of the franchise.358
Accordingly, it would take the Court just one step, not two, to apply the usual
framework to section 2. The Court would not have to puzzle over whether section 2 recognizes disparate impact discrimination since it obviously does. Instead, the Court could skip ahead to holding that this form of discrimination,
when it relates to voting, is regulated by the usual framework.
As for the Court’s landmark decision in Gingles, it involved only vote dilution—indeed, only one kind of vote dilution: the use of multimember districts
to submerge minority voters within a larger white population.359 Aware of the
case’s limited scope, the Court stressed that it did not mean to address other
section 2 issues. It had “no occasion to consider whether [its] standards . . . are
fully pertinent” to claims against single-member districts.360 It also had “no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits” challenges by minority groups that are
too small to control their own districts.361 And the Court remarked that while
the Senate factors are “pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly to
vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and may be considered.”362 “[S]ome Senate factors are more important to . . . vote-dilution

355.

More accurately, Title VII was ambiguous prior to its 1991 amendment. It now clearly recognizes “unlawful employment practice[s] based on disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A) (2018); see also supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
356. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518 (ﬁrst examining whether “antidiscrimination
laws . . . encompass disparate-impact claims” and only then explaining how “[d]isparate-impact liability must be limited” under the usual framework).
357. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71 (1986) (“In amending § 2, Congress rejected
the requirement . . . that § 2 plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory intent of state or local
governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism.”).
358. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
359. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 42 (titling the opinion’s key section “Section 2 and Vote Dilution
through Use of Multimember Districts”).
360. Id. at 46-47 n.12.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 45.
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claims,” but other considerations might be more pressing when different theories are advanced.363
In light of Gingles’s circumspectness, it makes little sense to treat its dicta as
gospel in other section 2 contexts. Gingles did not even try to answer every major
vote dilution question. It certainly did not purport to specify a test for vote denial
claims—challenges that barely registered with Congress when it amended section 2 or with the Court when it decided Gingles.364 Gingles’s references to “interact[ion] with social and historical conditions” and the “probative” Senate factors are thus best understood as a gloss on section 2’s brief text: a guide to the
provision’s typical operation.365 What these snippets are not is precisely what the
lower courts have wrongly made them: a legally enforceable standard for electoral practices that allegedly deny (but do not dilute) the franchise.
In any event, the tension between Gingles and the usual framework should
not be overstated. Gingles discusses measures’ links with past and present discrimination while the usual framework requires no such connection. But as
noted above,366 these links are almost always present when policies cause racial
disparities, even if they do not actually have to be proven. Likewise, neither Gingles nor the Senate factors include a justiﬁcation defense, though it is a crucial
stage of the usual framework. But the defense is substantively quite similar to
the Senate factor about the tenuousness of the government’s explanation. This
factor could be modiﬁed to heighten further its resemblance to the defense and
then made a more signiﬁcant part of the doctrine.367 Notably, this adjustment
would not conﬂict with Gingles, but rather would follow from its ﬂexible view of
the Senate factors. A revamped tenuousness factor would “also be relevant” and
one that “may be considered.”368 It would become “more important to [vote denial] claims,” just as other elements are more meaningful elsewhere.369

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at 48-49 n.15; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982) (noting that vote denial claims
“would not necessarily involve the same factors” as vote dilution claims).
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.6.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 48 n.15.
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B. Constitutional Convergence
The next objection to the uniﬁcation of disparate impact law is not that it is
barred but rather that it is redundant. Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiffs may dispute electoral practices that make it more difficult for
them to vote. Courts considering such claims ﬁrst “weigh ‘the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the [Constitution].’”370 The degree of judicial scrutiny then rises or falls along with the extent
of the burden on the franchise. “[W]hen those rights are subjected to ‘severe’
restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest
of compelling importance.’”371 “But when a state election law provision imposes
only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ . . . ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”372
The overlap between the usual framework and the constitutional inquiry
arises after a prima facie case has been established in a disparate impact suit. At
this point, assuming the jurisdiction mounts a justiﬁcation defense, the key issues under the usual framework are (1) whether the jurisdiction’s asserted interest is substantial; and (2) whether the challenged policy is necessary to achieve
this interest.373 Critically, these are the same issues that must be addressed in a
constitutional case after a court determines the severity of a measure’s burden on
the franchise. The court must next evaluate the strength of the jurisdiction’s interest and the measure’s ﬁt with this goal. Tailoring,374 in other words, is an indispensable element of the analysis under both section 2 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The same questions must be asked, and the same evidence
considered, whether the claim is statutory or constitutional.
The charge that the usual framework partly converges with the constitutional inquiry cannot be wholly rebutted. The doctrines are similar in that they
both rely on tailoring. Tailoring, though, is a ubiquitous feature of American

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
See supra Section II.C.6.
For the sake of brevity, I use “tailoring” to refer to both the evaluation of a jurisdiction’s interests and how closely the challenged policy serves these goals.
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public law. As Richard Fallon observes, “it dominate[s] numerous ﬁelds of constitutional law”375 because it offers a “solution to a generic problem”376: how to
balance a valued good (like section 2’s aspiration of racial equality in voting, or
the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ aim that the franchise be exercised
freely) against countervailing state interests, of varying weight, that demand the
good’s sacriﬁce. So it cannot be much of a strike against the usual framework
that it employs this methodology. Given the methodology’s prevalence, it would
be more of a surprise if it did not make an appearance in disparate impact law.
If the usual framework were adopted, it would also not be the ﬁrst time that
the same facts could spawn suits under both section 2 and the Constitution. It is
already black-letter law, with respect to any type of electoral practice, that it
equally violates section 2377 and the Reconstruction Amendments378 if it was enacted with racially discriminatory intent.379 In the vote dilution context, too, atlarge elections and district plans may be invalid under both section 2 (if they fail
the elaborate test created by Gingles and its progeny380) and the Reconstruction
Amendments (if an invidious objective is inferred from the totality of circumstances381). Under the usual framework, then, vote denial law would be one
more entry on this list: one more area where statutory and constitutional theories intersect.
As a doctrinal matter, furthermore, this intersection would be quite limited.
First, the usual framework and the constitutional inquiry have different triggers
for their tailoring stages. Under the former, a prima facie case of a racially disparate impact must be proven, while under the latter, a policy’s burden on the
right to vote must be ascertained. Second, once the tailoring stage is reached, it

375.
376.
377.

378.
379.

380.
381.

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2007) (discussing
strict scrutiny speciﬁcally rather than tailoring more generally).
Id. at 1270.
See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[A] plaintiff . . . may
demonstrate a [section 2] violation by proving either: (1) the subjective discriminatory motive
of legislators or other relevant officials; or (2) [discriminatory results].”).
See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980) (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment); id. at 65-80 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment).
The same is true with respect to public employees’ claims of intentional racial discrimination.
“[T]he law of equal protection” has “the same substantive content as Title VII’s prohibition
on disparate treatment.” Primus, supra note 217, at 1354.
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986) (setting forth the preconditions for liability now known as the “Gingles prongs”).
For an example of an illicit motive being inferred in the absence of smoking-gun evidence, see
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-28 (1982).
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proceeds differently under each doctrine. Under the usual framework, the question is always the same: is the measure necessary to achieve a substantial interest? But under the Constitution, judicial review can vary from highly deferential
(if the burden on the franchise is light) to very stringent (if the burden is severe).382 And third, after the tailoring stage concludes, the plaintiff may still offer
a less discriminatory alternative under the usual framework. The constitutional
inquiry, though, includes no opportunity for a surrebuttal.
It is not hard to see how these doctrinal distinctions could be consequential.
Suppose a plaintiff in a vote denial case cannot show a signiﬁcant racial disparity
or cannot link it to a particular electoral practice.383 Then the plaintiff loses under
the usual framework before its tailoring stage even begins. If the same policy is
challenged under the Constitution, in contrast, the tailoring stage cannot be
avoided. Whether the measure’s burden on the franchise is light or heavy, a court
will have to assess the importance of the interest the provision serves and how
well it serves it. Tailoring is thus a necessary component of the constitutional
inquiry but only a contingent part of the usual framework.
Or take a practice that causes a large racial disparity but does not make it
much more difficult to vote. (Photo ID requirements for voting arguably ﬁt in
this category. Some studies ﬁnd sizeable differences in valid photo ID possession
by race,384 while in the Supreme Court’s view, the requirements’ burdens on the
franchise are “neither so serious nor so frequent.”385) Under the usual framework, a prima facie case can typically be established against this sort of policy,
meaning that for it to be upheld, it must be necessary to achieve a substantial
interest. Under the Constitution, on the other hand, the level of scrutiny is much
lower. Because the law’s burden is light, it need only have some relation to a legitimate goal to be sustained. Again, then, the usual framework and the constitutional inquiry diverge despite the tailoring stage they nominally share.
C. Prior Record
The last counterargument I address is more historical than legal. It is that
the usual framework has been so disappointing in the areas where it has already

382.

Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (observing that, under Title VII, the justiﬁcation defense “involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution” when rational basis review is applied).
383. See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2 (discussing these requirements).
384. See, e.g., Hopkins et al., supra note 2, at 83 (summarizing eleven such studies).
385. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008).
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been tried that it should not be exported to any new ﬁeld. Why are (some) scholars unhappy with the usual framework? Plaintiffs’ low success rates in disparate
impact claims brought pursuant to it are the main explanation. As summarized
earlier, these rates are 20% to 25% under Title VII,386 less than 20% under the
FHA,387 and less than 15% under Title VI.388 The recurring defeats are compounded by the limited numbers of disparate impact claims that are ﬁled in the
ﬁrst place. Under Title VII, there has only been a “small volume of . . . disparate
impact litigation in recent years,”389 while under the FHA and Title VI, only a
few dozen disparate impact cases have ever been decided at the appellate level.390
Due to these sobering statistics, several academics have reached gloomy conclusions about the usual framework’s utility. For instance, Selmi writes (in an
article titled Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?) that “there has been no
area where [Title VII’s] disparate impact theory has proved transformative or
even particularly successful.”391 Similarly, Abernathy comments (in Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for Discrimination) that Title VI’s “effects
test . . . was a concept that judges profoundly distrusted and were unable or unprepared to implement.”392 Neither Selmi nor Abernathy has anything to say
about section 2. But their implicit message is clear: Be careful what you wish for.
Do not put your faith in a legal standard that has brought nothing but tears in
other domains.
To begin with, lawsuits’ numbers and success rates are a poor guide to a legal
theory’s social value. A theory could be symbolically signiﬁcant even if it generates few cases and fewer plaintiff victories. As Richard Primus has remarked
about the usual framework in the Title VII context, “[I]t does preserve some
awareness that existing racial hierarchies are products of past discrimination and
that a level-playing-ﬁeld approach today could help those hierarchies perpetuate

386.

See Selmi, supra note 14, at 738-39.
387. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 393.
388. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 300-11.
389. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493,
587 (2003).
390. See Abernathy, supra note 188, at 312; Seicshnaydre, supra note 14, at 391-92.
391. Selmi, supra note 14, at 753 (but excepting cases about employment tests from this judgment).
392. Abernathy, supra note 188, at 273; see also, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and
the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (“Disparate impact doctrine
[under Title VII] has been in a massive decline over the past few decades.”); Olatunde C.A.
Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396 (2007) (noting “judicial concerns about
whether [the usual framework in Title VI cases] would require the judiciary to broadly restructure social institutions”).
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themselves indeﬁnitely.”393 Additionally, a theory might be characterized by infrequent and ineffective litigation because it has already managed to change defendants’ behavior. This seems to be at least part of the Title VII story. In George
Rutherglen’s words, “The failure of the theory of disparate impact as a vehicle
for continued litigation can . . . be attributed . . . to its past successes.”394 It previously “caus[ed] employers to abandon facially neutral employment practices,
such as general aptitude tests,” and “encourag[ed] employers to adopt affirmative action plans to eliminate the most obvious forms of disparate impact.”395
An equivalent dynamic is plausible in vote denial law.396 Say the usual framework is adopted and that plaintiffs then use it to prevail in a series of suits against
photo ID requirements for voting. Next, assume that jurisdictions respond either by abandoning these requirements or by passing less onerous provisions
(like ones that waive the need to show ID for citizens who sign hardship affidavits). Finally, imagine that plaintiffs challenge few of these next-generation laws
and often lose when they do sue. Section 2 would then exhibit the same features
as Title VII, the FHA, and Title VI: namely, a low volume of litigation and a
depressed win rate. Yet no one would infer from this data that section 2 is a “mistake” (Selmi) or a “failure” (Abernathy). The right conclusion, rather, would be
that section 2 has succeeded in its mission. It has ended (or at least alleviated)
practices responsible for unjustiﬁed racial disparities, leaving scarcer and less
promising targets for further suits.397

393.
394.
395.

396.

397.

Primus, supra note 389, at 587; see also, e.g., Jolls, supra note 302, at 671 (“[T]he simple number
of disparate impact claims is not a good measure of their underlying importance.”).
George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 139 (1995).
Id. at 136-37. Congress viewed the usual framework even more sunnily when it amended Title
VII in 1991. According to the Senate report, “the Griggs decision has had an extraordinarily
positive impact on the American workplace.” S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 15 (1990). “In hundreds
of cases, federal courts have struck down unnecessary barriers to the full participation of minorities and women in the workplace, and employers have voluntarily eliminated discriminatory practices in countless other instances.” Id.; see also, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
622 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal trial and appellate courts applied Griggs and
Albemarle to disallow a host of hiring and promotion practices . . . .”).
Of course, this dynamic would be even more potent if the underlying legal standard were
easier to satisfy (as the courts’ two-part test is compared to the usual framework). My point,
though, is that the dynamic is still strong even under the usual framework, as evidenced by a
less jaundiced appraisal of the record of Title VII and the FHA.
Interestingly, there is some evidence that this dynamic is occurring even without the usual
framework’s adoption. After a series of photo ID requirements were struck down on section
2 grounds, some states responded by passing less stringent provisions. These measures have
largely been upheld after they, in turn, were challenged. See, e.g., Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016) (sustaining Virginia’s photo ID law); Greater Birmingham
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Another response to the pessimism of Selmi, Abernathy, and their ilk highlights the differences rather than the commonalities between voting and the areas already governed by the usual framework. As discussed above, voting is a
nonmarket good regulated exclusively by the state.398 The strongest justiﬁcation
for racial disparities in employment and housing—private actors’ pursuit of
proﬁt—therefore cannot be asserted in defense of electoral practices. Voting is
also a nonrivalrous good whose consumption by one citizen does not affect its
use by others.399 The invalidation of franchise restrictions thus yields no innocent victims: no nonminorities are denied the ballot so minorities may vote instead. Both of these points suggest that, under the usual framework, outcomes
could be quite different in section 2 cases from those in Title VII and FHA suits.
Plaintiffs might have more luck because defendants would be unable to raise
their most potent objection and a zero-sum calculus would not apply to courtordered relief.
Lastly, what if Selmi, Abernathy, and the other skeptics are right? If the usual
framework has dashed its backers’ hopes in other ﬁelds, and if it would also be
a letdown in the vote denial context, then should it not be extended to section 2?
This is admittedly an unpleasant scenario: one where the usual framework neither promotes racial equality in voting, nor unearths discriminatory motives, nor
removes bottlenecks to political participation.400 But even in this case, I think
there is no alternative to the usual framework’s adoption. If I am correct that the
courts’ two-part test collapses into a single requirement of a racial disparity,401
then the test is simply not a viable option. Under current constitutional law,
Congress lacks the authority to impose such a requirement, and the judiciary
cannot employ it either without transgressing the colorblindness principle.402
Nor is any other legal standard feasible unless it shares the usual framework’s
“adequate safeguards,” in particular its justiﬁcation defense.403 These doctrinal
protections, the Supreme Court’s decisions make clear, are matters of constitutional necessity, not legislative grace.
I should reiterate that my own appraisal of the usual framework is rosier than
Selmi’s or Abernathy’s. I think it has produced real improvements in employment and housing practices—and that it would be even more effective in vote
Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (sustaining Alabama’s photo ID
law).
398. See supra Section II.B.3.
399. See id.
400. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the various theories of disparate impact law).
401. See supra Section I.D.
402. See id.
403. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523
(2015).
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denial cases. This more optimistic perspective is the primary reason the usual
framework’s past performance does not deter me from recommending its expansion. My secondary reason, though, is that the usual framework’s record is ultimately immaterial. Even if it has been the ﬁasco alleged by its critics, it is, at
present, the only doctrinal structure available for disparate impact law.
iv. applications
The objections to extending the usual framework to section 2 vote denial
claims are therefore unconvincing. Neither the statutory text nor Gingles calls for
the usual framework’s use—but the text does not endorse any other approach
either, and as a vote dilution case, Gingles sheds little light on vote denial issues.
The usual framework shares a tailoring stage with the constitutional analysis of
policies that burden the franchise—but this overlap is neither unusual nor very
extensive given the doctrines’ considerable differences. And the usual framework
may not have been a rousing success in other areas—but this judgment is debatable, potentially inapplicable to section 2, and irrelevant in the end due to the
lack of viable alternatives.
Since the objections do not persuade, it is natural to ask what the uniﬁcation
of disparate impact law would mean for particular electoral measures. Could
they be sensibly evaluated under the usual framework? If so, what would this
evaluation look like—what evidence would be presented to prove which points?
In this Part, I discuss the usual framework’s application to three common practices: photo ID requirements for voting, cutbacks to early voting, and all-mail
voting. I examine these laws not only because they are familiar but also because
each one is illustrative of a different kind of electoral policy. A photo ID requirement is an example of a new franchise restriction: a barrier to voting that did not
previously exist. A cutback to early voting is a reversal of a prior franchise expansion: a hardening of a regime that had earlier been softened. And all-mail voting
is a new franchise expansion: an innovation that makes it easier for certain citizens to vote.404
The theme of the ensuing analysis is the ﬂexibility of the usual framework.
It can be used, without restrictions or caveats, to assess all three types of electoral
measures. Because my focus is on how the usual framework would operate in a
range of settings, I do not comment on what its outcome might be in any speciﬁc

404.

The missing fourth category is a reversal of a prior franchise restriction. Few recent laws fall
into this category. Laws in this category also raise section 2 issues only in the unlikely event
that the prior restriction beneﬁted minority citizens (meaning that its repeal would advantage
nonminority citizens).
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case. No such conclusion could be generally valid anyway, due to the many differences that exist among jurisdictions and their voting practices. The usual
framework’s verdict, in other words, is inherently fact dependent, and the necessary facts cannot all be gathered ex ante.405
A. Photo ID Requirements
Starting with photo ID requirements, they are currently in effect in seventeen
states.406 Seven of these states categorically refuse to count ballots cast by voters
lacking proper IDs, while the other ten offer some sort of failsafe: an opportunity
to sign an affidavit of identity, for instance, or a chance to submit a provisional
ballot that is eventually counted if poll workers determine that the voter is eligible and registered.407 To establish a prima facie case under the usual framework,
a section 2 plaintiff challenging one of these provisions would have to show that
its selection rate for minorities is signiﬁcantly lower than its selection rate for
nonminorities. Selection rate, here, means the proportion of otherwise-eligible
citizens who possess a valid ID (or who are able to vote, despite lacking one, due
to a failsafe). These are the people who are “selected” for the beneﬁt of voting—
the ones, that is, who are not denied the franchise because of their inability to
comply with the photo ID requirement.
The requirement’s minority and nonminority selection rates may be estimated through a survey. Otherwise-eligible citizens in the jurisdiction may
simply be asked if they have a proper ID (or are able to vote due to a failsafe).408
The requirement’s selection rates may also be determined using governmental
records. Databases of registered voters and of people with valid IDs may be
merged, thus revealing the shares of registered voters, by race, who are able to

405.

One more note: When analyzing the usual framework’s applications in this Part, I do not cite
to my earlier discussion of the framework’s doctrinal features. See supra Sections II.A, II.C. I
trust that the reader recalls these features and does not need to be repeatedly reminded of
them.
406. See Wendy Underhill, Voter Identiﬁcation Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 31, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id
.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MWN-VBJD].
407. See id. Note that in states with “strict” photo ID requirements, voters may cast provisional
ballots, but these ballots are counted only if voters manage to obtain valid IDs within the
speciﬁed timeframe.
408. For examples of surveys being used in section 2 suits about photo ID requirements, see Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-cv-008, 2018 WL 1612190, at *2-3 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2018); and Frank v. Walker,
17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 871-72 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
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satisfy the requirement.409 However the selection rates are ascertained, the difference between them must be statistically signiﬁcant in order for the plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case.410 It would also be helpful to the plaintiff if the
difference was substantively large—for example, if the minority selection rate
was less than four-ﬁfths of the nonminority selection rate.411
Note that while the photo ID requirement’s selection rates are crucial under
the usual framework, minority and nonminority turnout rates are irrelevant. The
plaintiff need not demonstrate a difference in turnout by race, and the jurisdiction may not defend itself by arguing that minority and nonminority citizens
vote in similar proportions. Note also that, if there is a signiﬁcant racial difference between the photo ID requirement’s selection rates, the reason for the difference is immaterial. The plaintiff need not prove that the gap arose because of
the requirement’s interaction with social and historical discrimination, and it is
no defense for the jurisdiction that minority citizens’ subjective preferences
might explain the gap.
If a prima facie case is set forth, the next step would be for the jurisdiction,
if it wishes, to assert a justiﬁcation defense. The prevention of voter-impersonation fraud is the state interest most often invoked on behalf of photo ID requirements,412 though additional cited goals include following the lead of other states

409. For examples of database matching being used in section 2 suits about photo ID requirements,

see Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1268-70; Lee v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 188 F. Supp. 3d 577, 598-99 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016); North Carolina
State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 364-65 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d, 831
F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); and Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 661-62 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
410. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018) (requiring “differences in selection rate” that “are signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical terms”).
411. My review of relevant decisions suggests that the difference between photo ID requirements’
minority and nonminority selection rates is frequently statistically signiﬁcant but that the minority selection rate is rarely less than four-ﬁfths of the nonminority selection rate. See, e.g.,
Brakebill, 2018 WL 1612190, at *2 (Native American selection rate of 81% and non-Native
American selection rate of 88%); Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1269 (black
selection rate of 98% and white selection rate of 99%); Lee, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 599 (black
selection rate of 94-95% and white selection rate of 96-97%); McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 365
(black selection rate of 94% and white selection rate of 98%); Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 661
(Latino selection rate of 94% and non-Latino selection rate of 96%); Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at
872 (Latino selection rate of 85%, black selection rate of 87%, and white selection rate of 93%).
412. For examples of fraud prevention being asserted as a state interest in section 2 suits about
photo ID requirements, see Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1277-78;
McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 440-45; Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 653; and Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at
847-50.
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with such provisions, stopping undocumented immigrants from voting, and
bolstering voter conﬁdence.413 Any interest named by the jurisdiction must be
substantial in order to be recognized. Voter-impersonation fraud (the only kind
a photo ID requirement could thwart) must therefore be a real problem;414 legal
consistency with other states must be a genuine concern; a nontrivial number of
undocumented immigrants must seek to vote; and/or voter conﬁdence in the
electoral system must be worrisomely low. It is also the jurisdiction’s obligation
to make these showings. It bears the burden of introducing probative evidence
and convincing the court of the weight of its interests.
The jurisdiction bears the further burden of establishing that its photo ID
requirement is necessary to achieve its objectives. The requirement must, in fact,
deter would-be voter impersonators from carrying out their fraud, yield legal
harmony with other states, dissuade undocumented immigrants from going to
the polls, and/or improve voters’ faith in elections. There must also be no obvious alternative that would be equivalently effective. If one exists, then the photo
ID requirement is not actually necessary for the attainment of the jurisdiction’s
aims.415
Lastly, if the jurisdiction successfully mounts a justiﬁcation defense, the
plaintiff may canvass other options more exhaustively and try to identify a policy
that serves the jurisdiction’s interests as well—but without causing as large a
racial disparity. One substitute for a conventional photo ID requirement is such
413.

See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting these aims); see
also Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192-94 (2008) (also citing election
modernization as a goal).
414. The evidence is mostly undisputed that voter-impersonation fraud is extremely rare. Even
courts upholding photo ID requirements have conceded this point. See, e.g., Greater Birmingham Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1273 (“[T]here is a lack of evidence of any signiﬁcant inperson voter fraud in Alabama . . . .”); Lee, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 608-09 (“[S]tatistics reveal few
convictions nationally for voter impersonation fraud . . . .”); McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 441
(“[T]here was no evidence of voter impersonation fraud in North Carolina.”).
415. The best example of a court analyzing the necessity of a photo ID requirement in a section 2
case is the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Veasey, 830 F.3d 216. The court found that Texas’s
law had a “dubious connection” with fraud prevention because it “pushed more vulnerable
elderly voters away from in-person voting—a form of voting with little proven incidence of
fraud—and toward mail-in voting, which . . . is far more vulnerable to fraud.” Id. at 263. The
court also observed that while Texas “claimed to model its law after those from” other states,
it “rejected many ameliorative amendments that would have brought [its law] in line with
those states’ voter ID laws.” Id. The court further noted that Texas’s law “would not prevent
noncitizens from voting, since noncitizens can legally obtain a Texas driver’s license or concealed handgun license, two forms of [valid] ID.” Id. And in the court’s view, not only was
there “‘no credible evidence’” that Texas’s law would “increase public conﬁdence in elections,”
but witness testimony suggested that the law’s implementation “might actually undermine
voter conﬁdence.” Id. (quoting Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 655 (S.D. Tex. 2014)).
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a law paired with the free and automatic provision of photo IDs to all eligible
voters in the state. If everyone entitled to vote possessed a valid ID, then a photo
ID requirement could no longer have different minority and nonminority selection rates.416 Another possibility is taking and storing people’s photos when they
register to vote or go to the polls. These photos (rather than ones on IDs) could
then be used to prevent voter-impersonation fraud. One more idea (already used
by several states417) is adding a failsafe to a photo ID requirement. If the failsafe
allowed eligible and registered voters to cast ballots even if they lacked proper
IDs, it could eliminate (or at least mitigate) any disparate racial impact.
Proof of the availability of one of these less discriminatory alternatives would
result in a judgment for the plaintiff. A plaintiff victory, in turn, would typically
result in the invalidation of the photo ID requirement (whether the win occurred
at the ﬁnal stage of the usual framework or earlier in the process). In general, the
court would not attempt to revise the requirement in order to reduce its racially
disparate effect. The court would simply deem the provision a violation of section 2.
B. Early-Voting Cutbacks
Turning to cutbacks to early voting, they have been enacted by seven states
since 2010.418 All of these cutbacks have reduced the number of days prior to an
election in which early voting is offered. Some of the cutbacks have also limited
the number of locations in which early voting may take place419 or eliminated
citizens’ ability simultaneously to register and then to vote early.420 To make out
a prima facie case under the usual framework, a section 2 plaintiff disputing one
of these laws would have to show that, prior to the cutback, minority citizens
voted early at a signiﬁcantly higher rate than nonminority citizens. This racial
difference in early voting under the previous system would suggest that minority

416.

For a similar idea, proposing the pairing of a photo ID requirement with automatic voter
registration, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 99-105 (2014).
417. See Underhill, supra note 406.
418. See New Voting Restrictions, supra note 1.
419. See One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 931 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (discussing Wisconsin’s policy that each municipality offer early voting in only one location).
420. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 812 (S.D. Ohio)
(discussing Ohio’s elimination of the “Golden Week” during which voters could simultaneously register and vote early), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct.
1, 2014).
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citizens would be comparatively disadvantaged by the new policy. That is, the
new policy’s minority and nonminority selection rates likely would not be as favorable for minority citizens as those of the old one.421
These selection rates (like those of a photo ID requirement) may be estimated in at least two ways. Minority and nonminority citizens may be asked, via
a survey, if they cast their ballots early, by mail, on Election Day itself, or not at
all.422 Governmental records of voter participation may also be consulted.423
These records have the advantage that they often track when exactly voters cast

421.

Of course, if data are available about the new policy (because the section 2 suit is brought after
the cutback has gone into effect), then no speculation is necessary regarding the new policy’s
effects: its minority and nonminority selection rates can be compared directly to those of the
old policy. Additionally, while the comparison between the old and new laws is explicit here,
it was implicit in the above discussion of photo ID requirements. See supra Section IV.A. In
the absence of a photo ID requirement, the minority and nonminority selection rates are both
100% with respect to voter identiﬁcation. This is the baseline against which the challenged
provision’s selection rates are tacitly compared. Furthermore, the comparison between the old
and new laws is not identical to the retrogression inquiry under section 5 of the VRA. That
inquiry focuses “solely on voting opportunities enjoyed by minorities, and whether those opportunities would be reduced under the proposed law,” while the section 2 analysis examines
“whether minorities enjoy less opportunity to vote as compared to other voters.” Husted, 768 F.3d
at 558.
Lastly, one might argue that, under the usual framework, only the new law’s minority
and nonminority selection rates matter—that is, that the status quo ante is irrelevant. I think
this is not the best reading of the usual framework’s particularity requirement. The speciﬁc
provision being challenged in these cases is the cutback to early voting, not the new earlyvoting policy alone, stripped of its historical context. Cf. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“it is possible to bring [FHA] disparate-impact challenges to withdrawals” from previous defendant policies); Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 487 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (recognizing a Title VII disparate impact challenge to a “narrow change in [uniform]
policy” rather than the “broad requirement that bus operators wear a uniform”). Moreover, if
the old law’s selection rates were immaterial, then no voting restriction could be disputed
under section 2 if its new selection rates revealed an advantage for minority citizens. It would
be beside the point that minority citizens previously beneﬁted to a greater extent and then had
this edge signiﬁcantly reduced. In the absence of precedent compelling this result under the
usual framework, there seems to be no good reason to insist on it in the vote denial context.
Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 (2000) (noting that section 2 cases may
involve electoral “changes” in addition to “the status quo itself”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29
n.117 (1982) (stating that liability under section 2 is more likely “[i]f the procedure markedly
departs from past practices”).
422. For an example of a survey being used in a section 2 suit about an early-voting cutback, see
Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 830.
423. For examples of governmental records being used in section 2 suits about early-voting cutbacks, see North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 38485 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016); and Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 828-30.
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their early ballots; this is helpful in predicting the effects of reductions to (rather
than abolitions of) early voting.424 The records sometimes have the drawback,
though, of not listing the race of each voter; in this case, the race may be inferred
based on the voter’s name or (in racially homogeneous areas) place of residence.425 However the selection rates are calculated, the gap between them must
be worse for minority citizens under the new regime than under the old. And
worse (again as in the photo ID context) means a difference that is at least statistically signiﬁcant and preferably substantively large too.426
If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, the burden would then shift to
the jurisdiction to prove that its early-voting cutback is necessary to achieve a
substantial interest. The only rationales that have been advanced for cutbacks, to
date, are the related ones of saving money and allocating limited resources to
tasks other than administering early voting.427 For these explanations to pass
muster, the jurisdiction must convince the court that they are weighty: that
money is indeed tight and that election officials are, in fact, harried. The jurisdiction must also demonstrate that restricting early voting is crucial to the realization of these goals. The cutback must save sizeable sums and enable employees
to do their jobs considerably more efficiently, and there must be no other way to
bring about these beneﬁts.428

424.
425.

426.

427.

428.

See, e.g., McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 384-85 (analyzing voter participation “when broken down
by the ﬁrst seven days of early voting”).
See, e.g., Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 828-30 (using “three standard ecological inference techniques to draw inferences about the [early voting] rates of blacks and whites in Ohio” (quoting Expert Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Daniel A. Smith at 2, Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (No.
14-cv-404), ECF No. 53-11)).
My review of relevant decisions suggests that early-voting cutbacks tend to have an adverse
effect on minority citizens that is both statistically signiﬁcant and substantively large. See, e.g.,
McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 384 n.74 (ﬁnding that more than 60% of black voters in North
Carolina voted early in 2008 and 2012, compared to less than 50% of white voters); Husted, 43
F. Supp. 3d at 829 (ﬁnding that about 20% of black voters in Ohio voted early in 2012, compared to less than 10% of white voters).
See, e.g., One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 933 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (noting
Wisconsin’s arguments that reducing early voting would “allow the state to conduct uniform,
orderly elections,” give election officials “more time for other tasks,” and “save[] money”); see
also McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 445-47 (citing similar arguments by North Carolina); Husted,
43 F. Supp. 3d at 844-46 (citing Ohio’s antifraud and efficiency arguments).
Courts have tended to doubt that early-voting cutbacks would yield signiﬁcant improvements
in cost or efficiency. See, e.g., One Wis. Inst., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 934 (expressing skepticism that
“[a]lleviating the workload for clerks could be sufficient reason to limit the hours for in-person absentee voting”); Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 845 (“[N]othing in the record . . . demonstrate[s] that the old system created undue or burdensome costs.”). But see McCrory, 182 F.
Supp. 3d at 446 (pointing out that “by reallocating the resources devoted to the ﬁrst seven
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If the jurisdiction makes these showings to the court’s satisfaction, the plaintiff would have a ﬁnal opportunity to demonstrate that a comparably effective
but less discriminatory alternative does actually exist. The plaintiff might argue
that if the number of early-voting days was reduced, but more early-voting sites
were opened for longer hours each day, then minority citizens would not be as
disadvantaged while the jurisdiction would retain most of its scarce resources.429
Or, switching these variables into another conﬁguration, the plaintiff might recommend that the number of early-voting days be kept constant but with fewer
early-voting sites open for shorter hours each day. If either of these options (or
another proposal) would be similarly efficient while generating a smaller racial
disparity, then the plaintiff would prevail. And if the plaintiff won, of course, the
remedy would be the nulliﬁcation of the jurisdiction’s early-voting cutback.
C. All-Mail Voting
All-mail voting is the last policy I consider to illustrate the ﬂexibility of the
usual framework. Twenty-two states conduct at least some elections by mail,
meaning every registered voter is sent a ballot that the voter may then complete
and return by mail during a speciﬁed period.430 Three states use all-mail voting
for all of their elections.431 Preliminarily, certain observers claim that franchise
expansions are beyond the scope of section 2 vote denial suits. A Fifth Circuit
judge, for instance, has stressed the “difference between making voting harder in

days of early voting,” North Carolina’s law “provides for more polling places rather than
fewer” and “establishes longer, more convenient hours of early voting”).
It is also relevant in a cutback case if, until recently, the state did provide more opportunities for early voting. “[I]f a jurisdiction has successfully run an extended early voting period . . . this fact will tend to undercut arguments that the burdens a more restrictive system
imposes on minority voters are the unavoidable cost of pursuing the jurisdiction’s other permissible goals.” Karlan, supra note 8, at 782.
429. This is essentially the regime that North Carolina instituted in 2013 (at least according to the
district court’s decision about the state’s omnibus law). See McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 446.
As in this case, a jurisdiction’s past or ongoing practice is one place to which a plaintiff may
turn for data. Other jurisdictions’ records may also illuminate reasonable alternatives.
430. See Dylan Lynch, All-Mail Elections, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 15, 2018), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/all-mail-elections.aspx [https://perma.cc
/YBU9-JDXE]. All-mail states still provide some opportunities for in-person voting before
and on Election Day.
431. These are Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. See id.
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ways that . . . disproportionately burden minorities and making voting easier in
ways that may not beneﬁt all demographics equally.”432
I think this position is untenable. In the extreme case, suppose a jurisdiction
passes a law that facilitates voting only for nonminority citizens. Perhaps nonminority citizens get an extra week to vote early, or may vote without displaying
a photo ID, or may bypass the line at the polling place. Everyone presumably
agrees that such a measure could be challenged under section 2.433 Even if the
law does not affect the absolute position of minority citizens, it still produces a
racial disparity by worsening their relative position vis-à-vis nonminority citizens. The same logic holds for less dramatic hypotheticals. A facially neutral statute, too, may beneﬁt nonminority citizens to a greater extent than minority citizens, thus causing a disparate impact. That the race-neutral policy does not harm
minority citizens, in absolute terms, is beside the point. The policy’s minority
and nonminority selection rates are still less favorable for minority citizens than
the status quo ante.434
Assuming all-mail voting is subject to section 2 attack, the ﬁrst step under
the usual framework would be for the plaintiff to prove that the law signiﬁcantly
disadvantages minority citizens. The law does so if it boosts nonminority participation by considerably more than it raises minority involvement.435 In this case,
the minority selection rate is substantially lower compared to the nonminority
selection rate under all-mail voting than it was under the previous regime.436
This scenario is plausible because minority citizens are less likely to have perma-

432.

433.
434.

435.
436.

Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Higginson, J., concurring); see
also Karlan, supra note 8, at 787 n.128 (“[E]xpansions of the franchise to constitutionally eligible citizens cannot, in themselves, impair any constitutional right of other citizens.”).
Of course, such a measure could also be challenged under the Constitution due to its racially
discriminatory intent.
This is a good example of a law that would not be retrogressive under section 5 of the VRA
but that could nevertheless be challenged under section 2. See supra note 421 and accompanying text. For a scholar agreeing with my view that section 2 applies to franchise expansions,
see Pershing, supra note 60, at 1174 (“For purposes of determining inequalities of access under
section 2, a convenience or beneﬁt to voting should be no different from a burden or other
imposition on that activity.”). For a case striking down a franchise expansion on section 2
grounds, see Mississippi State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss.
1987) (invalidating a relaxation of Mississippi’s dual registration system because, even as
amended, it remained racially discriminatory).
Note that voter turnout is the concept of interest here because that is what mail-in voting
directly affects. When citizens submit ballots by mail, they necessarily turn out to vote.
See supra note 421 (discussing the need to compare the new policy’s selection rates with those
of the old policy).
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nent addresses than nonminority citizens, more apt to live in areas with inconsistent mail delivery, and more prone not to return mail they receive.437 These
factors need not be documented by the plaintiff since the reason for the racial
disparity is irrelevant. But they help explain why a practice as seemingly innocuous as all-mail voting could raise section 2 concerns.
Second, the jurisdiction would have the chance to present a justiﬁcation defense. All-mail voting is most often endorsed on the grounds that it increases
voter turnout and allows most or all polling locations to be shuttered.438 The
jurisdiction must therefore show that voter participation and resource preservation are important ends. The jurisdiction must also establish a strong link between these ends and all-mail voting. It must clearly lift voter turnout and save
a good deal of money and labor, and it must be the best way to achieve these
goals.439
And third, the plaintiff would be able to offer an equivalently effective but
less discriminatory alternative. Mostly-mail (not all-mail) voting might be one
such policy. If citizens could vote by mail or in person at a reasonable number of
polling sites, then the racial disparity of all-mail voting could be reduced at a
relatively low cost.440 Another possibility is combining all-mail voting with targeted outreach to minority citizens and (for minorities who speak limited English) ballot instructions in additional languages.441 These supplements could
also lessen the disparate impact of all-mail voting at an affordable price. A ﬁnal
437.

See, e.g., Thad Kousser & Megan Mullin, Does Voting by Mail Increase Participation? Using
Matching to Analyze a Natural Experiment, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 428, 440 n.13 (2007) (ﬁnding that
under all-mail voting in Oregon, “[p]articipation was signiﬁcantly lower in precincts with
more Hispanic, Asian, black, or multiethnicity residents”).
438. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 430 (noting “possible advantages” for all-mail voting, including
“turnout” and “ﬁnancial savings”).
439. The empirical evidence is ambiguous as to whether all-mail voting increases voter turnout.
See, e.g., Paul Gronke & Peter Miller, Voting by Mail and Turnout in Oregon: Revisiting Southwell
and Burchett, 40 AM. POL. RES. 976, 984-87 (2012) (ﬁnding higher turnout under all-mail voting in Oregon in special but not in primary or general elections); Priscilla L. Southwell, Analysis of the Turnout Effects of Vote by Mail Elections, 1980-2007, 46 SOC. SCI. J. 211, 213-15 (2009)
(same, though with a small bump in general election turnout); Priscilla L. Southwell & Justin
I. Burchett, The Effect of All-Mail Elections on Voter Turnout, 28 AM. POL. Q. 72 (2000) (ﬁnding
a ten-percentage-point increase in participation among Oregon voters based on three all-mail
elections in 1995 and 1996).
440. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 430 (noting that, in Colorado, “voters can choose to cast a ballot at
an in-person vote center during the early voting period or on Election Day (or drop off, or
mail, their ballot back)”).
441. Section 203 of the VRA, codiﬁed at 52 U.S.C. § 10503(c) (2018), already requires covered jurisdictions to provide voting materials in additional languages and is thus a good precedent
for this proposal.
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option is voting via cell phone rather than via mailed ballot. Although there remain security issues with telephonic (and internet) voting, minority and nonminority citizens now own cell phones at virtually identical rates.442 If these rates
of cell-phone possession could be exported to the political sphere, racial differences in voting might be erased.
conclusion
In geology, an oxbow lake is a body of water that has become detached from
a river’s main route. The lake lies near the river but is no longer part of it.443 This
is essentially the relationship that now exists between disparate impact law and
vote denial doctrine under section 2. Disparate impact law is the river in the analogy: a broad waterway that holds within its banks Title VII, the FHA, and several more statutes. Section 2 vote denial doctrine, in turn, is the oxbow lake: a
small and strange lagoon cut off from, and so unaffected by, the ﬂow of the current.
In this Article, I have argued that the oxbow lake should join the river—that
disparate impact law, in other words, should be uniﬁed. Because of its isolation,
section 2 vote denial doctrine has been stymied by questions the rest of disparate
impact law answered long ago. Even worse, section 2 vote denial doctrine has
failed to develop the feature—the justiﬁcation defense—that bolsters the constitutionality of the rest of disparate impact law. Linking the oxbow lake to the river
would thus resolve a series of contentious issues and avert a looming threat to
section 2’s validity. This merger also remains appealing despite the objections
that have been raised to it and would be viable in every electoral context. It is
time, then, for the civil engineers to get to work. A major hydrological project
awaits them.

442.

See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet
/mobile [https://perma.cc/78Y2-245T] (showing white, black, and Hispanic smartphone
ownership rates of 77%, 75%, and 77%, respectively).
443. See Oxbow Lake, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia
/oxbow-lake [https://perma.cc/KW3P-2L36]. Unlike an oxbow lake, of course, section 2 was
not part of the disparate impact river at some previous point.
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